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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
On November 22, 1963, President John F. Kennedy died by an assassin!s 
bullet. This event ended one era and opened another for his brother, 
Robert F. Kennedy. Until Dallas, Robert Kennedy had submerged himself 
in his brother's work. As Jack Newfield writes: 
The assassination punctured the center of Robert Kennedy's 
universe. It removed the hero-brother for whom he had 
submerged all of his own great competitive instincts. It 
took away, in one instant of insanity, all of the power they 
had struggled together for ten years to achieve, and gave it 
to another, whom they both mistrusted. It thrust a man 
trained for the shadows into the sunlight. It made Robert 
Kennedy, a man unprepared for introspection, think for 
the first time in his life, what he wanted to do, and what 
he stood for.l 
What Kennedy would do and what he would stand for rested to a large 
extent in the hands of that "mistrusted" one, Lyndon Baines Johnson. 
On November 24, 1963, two days after the assassination, the President 
convened a small group to meet with the Ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry 
Cabot Lodge. Johnson established his Vietnam policy: 
I am not going to lose Vietnam. I am not going to be the 
President who saw Southeast Asia go the way China went .. 
They'll think with Kennedy dead, we've lost heart. So they'll 
think we're yellow and don't mean what we say ..•. The 
Chinese. The fellas in the Kremlin. They'll be taking 
the measure of us .... I'm not going to make Vietnam 
go the way of Ch~na.2 
1 
2 
That determination set the stage for a continuing struggle between 
Kennedy and Johnson over the conflict in Vietnam. At first hesitantly, 
then vigorously, RFK challenged the Administration. 
This challenge would not come easily to Robert Kennedy. The 
Vietnam War was one of the many legacies left by his brother I s Admini-
stration. When John Kennedy assumed office, 685 Americans were serving 
in South Vietnam. When be died, that number had increased to 16,500 
3 men. All involved, including Robert Kennedy, knew a connnitment of that 
size was not painlessly revoked. 
While American commitment grew, the chances for success diminished. 
On November 1, 1963, a group of young army officers deposed Ngo Dinh Diem, 
the leader of South Vietnam. At the time of the coup, the government of 
South Vietnam consisted of Diem and members of his family; thus, the 
coup seemed to be a great opportunity for a "New Deal" in that embattled 
4 country. Unfortunately, the overthrow of Diem resulted in neither reform 
nor stability. In 1964 alone, Lyndon Johnson dealt with seven different 
. s . 5 governments in aigon. As Chester Cooper writes: 
In late 1963, the President had no way of knowing that 
already present were all of the ingredients that would 
soom combine to tear the fabric of American society apart 
and eventually lead to his decision not to seek a second 
term: the strength of the Communists was increasing, our 
Vietnamese ally was unable to achieve a broadly based and 
effective government, and frustration and anxiety were 
growing among the American people.6 
These ingredients would fuse only if Johnson persisted in his course. 
Unfortunately, Johnson's Vietnam policy did not change until he announced 
his decision on March 31, 1968, not to seek reelection. 
3 
Johnson's policy was designed to cope with both domestic unrest and 
the military situation in Vietnam. In Vietnam, he began bolstering 
whatever regime was in power with public expressions of support, while 
steadily increasing the military pressure on the Vietcong and the North 
Vietnamese. These actions would, Johnson hoped, produce a stable 
government in South Vietnam and a battered foe in the field who would 
be willing to negotiate on American terms. On the domestic front, 
Johnson chose to defend his approach as the only reasonable course against 
an increasing chorus of critics. 7 
In his excellent book, What Washington Said, F .M. Kail examines the 
rationales offered by the government for the American actions in Vietnam. 8 
Since Lyndon Johnson precipitated the bulk of the action, the book 
emphasizes his rhetoric. Johnson presented three primary reasons for 
the war in Vietnam. First, the Americans would improve the quality of 
life in Vietnam. This justification "focuses mainly on the demand that 
the people of that country had a right, through free elections, to select 
9 their own government." Johnson sought to capitalize on the high American 
regard for self-determination. This rationale also touched upon the 
American effort to build schools, roads, hospitals, and perform other 
humanitarian actions. To put it bluntly, we should carry the "white man's 
burden" of bringing the Vietnamese into the twentieth century. The 
second justification rested upon the "Domino Theory." If America did not 
apply a limited amount of force now, it might have to apply massive 
10 force later on, over a larger area, perhaps closer to home. This 
reason dovetailed neatly with the traditional, bipartisan containment 
4 
policy. America would prevent the Communists from achieving their goal 
of world revolution. Finally, Johnson spoke of America's honor. The 
United States had a conmdtment to South Vietnam, a commitment that Eisen-
11 hower initiated and John Kennedy supported. Lyndon Johnson's America 
kept its word. Naturally, all three of these justifications formed a 
seamless web; however, they represent the basic elements of the policy 
that Robert Kennedy challenged. 
Kennedy began to challenge Johnson's policy because increasingly 
it became clear that it could not work. Further, the American effort 
was creating havoc in Vietnam. The constant bombing devastated the 
country and American policy maximized the damage to the country. Chester 
Cooper explains Johnson's approach this way: 
The intent was to hold the domestic front until, with 
American help and guidance, the Vietnamese would pull 
up their own socks. The hope was that with heavier 
bombing the men in Hanoi would come to the negotiating 
table. The expectation was that with more and more 
American troops deployed Comm~~ist attrition would 
become unacceptable to Hanoi. 
The attrition rate never did become unacceptable to Hanoi. Since Johnson's 
policy depended upon the cooperation of Hanoi in making this judgment, it 
was bound to fail. Further any policy which identified destruction as 
its only objective was morally repugnant, especially in a country where 
the United States found it difficult to separate friend from enemy. The 
fact that these crushed enemies were expected to peacefully rejoin the 
political process in South Vietnam, after suffering through years of 
official "attrition", made the policy even more suspect. Given all of 
these problems, Robert Kennedy began to question, then attack, this 
approach to the war. Given Kennedy's unique political and rhetorical 
position, he found himself facing a complex challenge. 
Statement of the Problem 
5 
Robert F. Kennedy ranks as one of the foremost critics of the Vietnam 
War. Yet rhetorical critics have afforded him surprisingly little 
attention. 13 The unique features of his rhetoric arose from his ability 
to force the American people to come to grips with issues they did not 
want to face. That success, however, did not come easily, and Kennedy 
had to overcome problems posed by the audience and by his own credibility, 
Memories of an era of protest have tended to obscure a clear view 
of the actual situation from 1964-1968. During this time, a majority 
f Am • 11 d A . 1 . . V. 14 Th . o ericans genera y supporte merican po icy in ietnam. eir 
natural inclination to rally around the President during a "war" found 
reinforcement on the evening news, which reported steady American 
15 progress. Only after the Tet offensive in January of 1968 did the 
public turn strongly against Johnson, and even then it was unclear whether 
the object of the dissatisfaction was the war or merely Johnson's 
handling of it. While many people came to doubt the wisdom of the war 
during this time, Robert Kennedy faced an audience that was not prepared 
readily to accept his proposals for a new policy. Thomas Powers's 
analysis of American views of the war recreates the complexity of this 
rhetorical situation: 
For all the bitter argument over the war, it remained 
strangely distant, a far-away struggle on the periphery 
of American life. Business boomed. Few families had lost 
sons and there was no rationing. The killing all took 
place on television, between coI11I11ercials, and the government 
insisted there was money enough for both guns and butter. 
6 
Even after President Johnson asked Congress for a 10 percent 
tax surcharge, the first request for new sources of money 
directly linked to Vietnam, the fighting itself remained 
remote •••• Calling for a halt in the war in August 1967, 
when Johnson made his appeal for a tax surcharge, would 
have exacted a more immediate price in national humiliation, 
in lingering recriminations about a "stab in the back." The 
average American, and even the average Senator or Repre-
sentative, instinctively felt the cost of ending the war 
was far greater than the cost of continuing it. The problem 
facing the antiwar movement was to make the war more costly 
than a change in policy ••• to impose a sanction on the 
country for a continuation of the war.16 
With others who opposed the war, Robert Kennedy saw the need to 
specify the price Americans paid for the continued fighting. That price 
became the centerpiece of his rhetoric as he sought to arouse the American 
people without making himself the issue, because making himself the issue 
was one of the great dangers he faced. 
Kennedy's reputation entailed significant liabilities. Many people 
ragarded Robert Kennedy as a ruthless opportunist who would stop at nothing 
to regain the 'White House for himself and his family. 17 From this perspective, 
the Vietnam War was being cynically used by him to further his own political 
fortunes. His well-known dislike for President Johnson only exacerbated 
18 the problem. The Christian Science Monitor cogently expressed this view 
of Kennedy's speaking: 
•••• when Senator Robert Kennedy breaks with President 
Johnson, the country knows there is far more in the offing 
than merely the conduct of the war. 
There is, first, Senator Kennedy's unceasing 
and purposeful determination to seize upon every issue 
which he believes can bring him closer to the White 
House. There is, second, the never-healed animosity 
of the Kennedy group for the man who succeeded John F. 
Kennedy in the Presidency. There is, third, the 
continuing effort of the Senator's campaign managers 
to invest everything he says with double importance 
regardless of the subject or whether others have said 
it earlier, 
Thus, among the certain effects of the Kennedy speech 
will be to heighten domestic tension over the war and to 
deepe~ political clef~ages as the 1968 Presidential 
campaign approaches. 
7 
Some of the resentment of Kennedy and the cynicism about his motives 
came as a result of his reversal of position on the war. During his 
brother's administration, Robert Kennedy strongly supported the U.S. 
effort in Vietnam. In 1962, on a tour of Southeast Asia, he stated: "The 
solution there lies in winning it. That is what the President intends 
20 to do." RFK was fascinated with the concept of counterinsurgency, 
specifically that the Green Berets and other units should be used to 
fight the guerrillas with guerrilla tactics. In opposing the war, Robert 
Kennedy abtacked his brother's appointees, his brother's policy, and, 
ultimately his own past judgments. Unless he could offer a convincing 
rationale for this dramatic conversion, Kennedy was vulnerable to charges 
of political opportunism. 
It would be foolish, however, to ignore the Senator's enormous rhetorical 
assets. He was heir to perhaps the most powerful political force in 
America. The mere name of "Kennedy" guaranteed a national forum for the 
junior Senator from New York. The name also assured him of considerable 
political support and power. Robert Kennedy was a force in the Democratic 
Party, probably the only person with the leverage to lead a revolution 
that had any chance at success. Moreover, he possessed the political skill 
d · k d f h · . · 21 an magnetism to ta ea vantage o tis situation. Finally, as this 
thesis will demonstrate, he was a rhetor of no mean ability. Kennedy 
could turn a phrase, and that skill would become crucial in the upcoming 
battle. 
The problem, then, is clear. Robert Kennedy sought to change 
American policy in Vietnam. Lyndon Johnson was unlikely to change at 
Kennedy's request, so the Senator had to convince the American people 
to demand a change. They, however, saw little reason to change, and, 
8 
in fact, felt rather comfortable with the situation as it was. Further, 
they were not likely to listen to a politician as opportunistic as 
Robert Francis Kennedy. Senator Kennedy needed to find a way to shatter 
this complacency. 
Methodology 
Any approach to the rhetoric of Robert Kennedy should focus on his 
attempt to force a debate among the American people. I shall argue that 
Kennedy sought to make public his private experience on the war. If 
RFK would induce the American people to undergo the same process as he 
had, he would shatter their complacency and, thus, force argument and 
change. I shall maintain that Kennedy used three overarching strategies 
to create a consensus f~r debate and change. Maurice Natanson's concept 
f . "d th · · 22 N b · · h o genuine argument provi es e starting pomt. atanson egins wit 
the problem of a complacent audience and notes that people seldom risk 
their strongly held feelings and values in argument. Instead, they prefer 
to remain on the surface of a dispute. Genuine argument requires "the 
commitment of the self to the full implications of the philosophical dialectic. 1123 
In genuine argument, the participants open themselves and their fundamental 
assumptions to challenge. Naturally, people do not undertake this risk 
often or lightly. Natanson argues that "the affective world of the person" 
must be "existentiaily disrupted" to achieve genuine argument. 24 
Natanson describes the challenge facing Kennedy. He needed to 
create genuine argument; thus, he needed to disrupt the world of his 
audience. I shall argue that Kennedy used confrontative rhetorical 
9 
tactics to achieve that goal. Most critics have portrayed confrontative 
rhetoric as reflecting an intractable conflict between two rival factions. 25 
Robert L. Scott and Donald K. Smith, however, offer a crucial observation 
about confrontation. They argue that the key to confrontation is 
guilt: "for having betrayed humanity, you are overwhelmed by guilt. The 
sense of guilt stops your hand, for what you would kill is the world you 
26 have made." Guilt can only occur if the audience recognizes as valid 
the speaker's charges of moral transgression. Confrontative tactics 
depend upon that recognition and, thus, upon the assumption of shared 
values that have been violated. 
Once Kennedy created guilt in the audience for their role in the 
prosecution of the war, he needed to channel that emotion in the direction 
of positive change. RFK built upon the base of shared values to create 
identification. I shall argue that after Kennedy used confrontative 
tactics "to pry apart the machinery of established power," he offered his 
own definition of what it meant to be a "good" American in wartime. 27 I 
shall contend he made himself one with the audience and then enacted for 
them the process of change. They could change as he did, for he shared 
the same values and beliefs about what it meant to be an American. By 1968, 
RFK made explicit his definition of patriotism and offered it as a means 
for Americans to expiate their guilt and change policy, while still feeling 
like patriots, not traitors. By using the concepts of confrontation, 
identification, audience creation, and genuine argument, I hope to analyze 
and illuminate the rhetorical transaction that occurred. 
10 
Review of the Literature 
Few scholarly works examine the rhetoric of Robert Kennedy. Several 
theses and dissertations have appeared about Kennedy, but only two discuss 
the speeches on Vietnam. Craig Cutbirth examines Kennedy's Vietnam 
rhetoric in light of Lloyd Bitzer's concept of the rhetorical situation. 
Cutbirth argues that Kennedy's primary focus until February 8, 1968, was 
President Johnson. 28 In other words, Kennedy designed his rhetoric to deal 
with the exigence of a hostile sitting President, not with the exigence 
of the Vietnam War. Cutbirth's analysis reveals much about the Democratic 
Party maneuverings and the impact of Kennedy's speeches on the political 
scene, but little about the rhetorical transaction between Kennedy and 
the audience. 
In contrast to Cutbirth who contends that for Kennedy" ••. the 
war did not become the overiding or organizing exigence until 1968,"29 I 
shall argue that the speeches delivered between 1965 and 1968 seek to influence 
the debate over Vietnam policy. A. Weintraub looks at Kennedy's statements 
on the war from the death of his brother through his own death, using the 
d . . 1 f . . 1 d d. . t · 3o Th· ff . tra itiona canons o invention, sty e, an isposi ion. is e ort is 
primarily descriptive and fails to take into account Kennedy's confrontation 
with the audience. Based as it is on the traditional canons, Weintraub's 
analysis ignores the confrontative aspects of Kennedy's speech and, instead, 
tries to examine ways that Kennedy adapts to the audience and to the 
problem of Lyndon Johnson. Both of these works seem to refuse to take 
Kennedy at his word and assume that he was most concerned with President 
Johnson and less with the war itself. I believe that this thesis, based 
on a clear reading of the text, will prove that Kennedy focused primarily 
11 
on the war. I shall argue that confrontation with the audience, rather 
than adaptation to the President, characterizes these speeches. 
Other than studies by communications scholars, most of the work on 
K d k h f f b . h . . . 31 Wh · 1 f enne y ta est e arm o iograp ies or reminiscences. i e many o 
these authors display sensitivities to rhetorical concerns, none analyzes 
Kennedy's rhetoric. The works of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Jack 
Newfield have been of particular help in providing detailed accounts of 
Kennedy's life at the time of these speeches. Other than books of this 
sort, studies of Robert Kennedy have been rare. 
A wealth of material has appeared treating the Vietnam War. While 
this study examines RFK's rhetoric about the war, several books on the 
war itself have proved very useful. Chester Cooper's The Lost Crusade, 
Thomas Pow.ers"' The War at Home, David Halberstam' s The Best and The 
Brightest, and Stanley Karnow's Vietnam provide clear, well-written 
32 accounts of the period. 
In selecting the speeches for this study, I have been as inclusive 
as possible. The speeches and statements analyzed here represent all of 
the major statements given by Kennedy on Vietnam. The only exception is 
33 the chapter on Vietnam in his book, To Seek A Newer World. I have omitted 
this essay because it simply repeats large sections of the speeches 
studied here. The speeches to be examined provide a comprehensive view 
of Kennedy's discourse on Vietnam. All of the texts have been taken from 
the collection at the Kennedy Library. Discrepancies between versions of 
the individual texts will be discussed below in the course of the specific 
analyses. 
12 
Precis of the Chapters 
This thesis will examine the speeches of Robert Kennedy chronologically. 
Chapter 2 analyzes addresses Kennedy made on May 6, 1965, and July 9, 1965. 
These speeches demonstrate the vagueness of Kennedy's early statements 
on Vietnam and his hesitancy in attacking Johnson's policy. They also 
reveal Kennedy's first attempts to begin a dialogue with the American 
people on Vietnam policy. Chapter 3 examines Kennedy's statement of 
February 19, 1966, advocating the inclusion of the National Liberation 
Front in the peace talks. Although the speech was not well-received, Kennedy 
laid the groundwork for his use of traditional American values by aligning 
himself with those values. Chapter 4 is devoted to the March 2, 1967, 
speech which morally condemned the war, himself, and his audience. This 
speech most clearly reveals RFK's strategy of confrontation and genuine 
argument. Chapter ,5 looks at the extensions Kennedy made on the arguments 
of the March 2nd speech. On Face the Nation on November 26, 1967, he 
argued, for the first time, that John Kennedy's war was different from 
Lyndon Johnson's war. Kennedy also assailed the Administration's justifi-
cations for the war. Further, on February 8, 1968, Kennedy reacted to the 
Tet offensive in Vietnam by condemning the war in very strong terms. Finally, 
Chapter 6 examines the rhetorical implications of Kennedy's discourse, 
emphasizing the importance of confrontation, the use of shared values to 
create confrontation, and the genuine argument that resulted. 
A recent column colIIIllemorating his death says of Robert Kennedy: 
One sensed that R.F.K. would accept sacrifice and suffer 
politically for his beliefs. The difference was that one 
also sensed that he would want others to sacrifice and 
perhaps suffer too •••• What was behind .•. the 
hate and the love alike was a hunch that he meant what 
he said. That is not something that we know about a 
lot of politicians today)4 
This thesis seeks to discover how Robert Kennedy earned such praise 
through his rhetoric on Vietnam. 
13 
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CHAPTER TWO 
RIGHT MAKES MIGHT 
The 1964 Democratic National Convention saw the emergence of Robert F. 
Kennedy as an independent political leader. A few days before the con-v-en-
tion, he had announced his candidacy for the Senate from New York, the 
first time Kennedy had sought elective office. At the convention itself, 
Kennedy became the obJect of adulation. When he rose to speak in honor 
of his brother, the delegates refused to yield the floor. For twenty 
1 minutes. they cheered the former Attorney General In the midst of the 
tumult, few were paying attention to a small war halfway around the world. 
That war, much more than the convention, would determine the politic~! 
futures of both Robert Kennedy and the Democratic nominee, Lyndon Johnson. 
The Republican Party also met in the summer of 1964 and it nominated 
Barry Goldwater, a maJor general in the Air Force Reserve and a prominent 
conservative, as its candidate for the Presidency. President Johnson, 
never one to miss an opportunity, ran as the peace candidate. Only Lyndon 
Johnson, he implied, could be trusted to keep the peace. In Manchester, 
New Hampshire, Johnson spoke on the Vietnam War: 
I have not thought that we were ready for American boys to 
do the fighting for Asian boys. What I have been trying 
to do •.• was to get the boys in Vietnam to do their own 
fighting with our advice and with our equipment . . We 
are not going north and drop bombs at this stage of the 
game • . . • 2 
While Johnson ran as a reasonable man, he also made it clear that even 
16 
reasonable men can only be pushed so far. An incident in the Tonkin 
Gulf allowed him to demonstrate his presidential resolve. 
17 
The events in the Tonkin Gulf in early August of 1964 have remained 
murky even to the present day. Johnson's response to the alleged attacks 
on American destroyers by the North Vietnamese, however, were crystal 
clear. He ordered the bombing of coastline targets in North Vietnam. He 
requested Congress to pass a resolution giving him the necessary authority 
to react quickly and decisively to future Communist provocations. The 
resolution was modeled on a similar authorization passed during the 
Eisenhower Administration, giving the President the power to respond 
3 immediately if the Chinese Communists invaded Quemoy and Matsu. Johnson 
invoked this precedent, swore he did not want to enlarge the war, and 
received his authorization. Few Senators realized the power that they 
had ceded to the President. 
One future Senator took little or no public notice of this action. 
Robert Kennedy was busy running a strenuous campaign for the Senate in 
which he was the maJor issue. Vietnam did not play a role in the campaign, 
especially after the passage of the Tonkin Gulf resolution and the resulting 
4 atmosphere of bipartisan support for the President. It may have been 
fortunate that Kennedy ignored the war, for the complexion of the fighting 
changed dramatically after the election. 
The Tonkin Gulf Resolution gave Johnson the power to expand the war, 
but he did not take advantage of that power until early in his new term. 
On February 7, 1965, the President received the excuse, or, depending 
upon your point of view, the provocation that led to the escalation of 
18 
the war. On that day, the Viet Cong attacked an American airfield 
at Pleiku, killing 9 Americans and wounding 140. "They are killing 
our men while they sleep at night," he told congressional leaders, and 
"the time had come to end a situation in which the Americans fought with 
one hand tied behind their backs. 115 American bombers embarked on a long 
series of sorties against North Vietnam itself, and American combat troops 
began to fill South Vietnam. The importance of this action is difficult 
to underestimate. Once American boys began to die, withdrawal would mean 
surrender, for who could want those boys to die in vain? Further, the 
bombing campaigns led directly to the presence of American prisoners of 
f h . f h . ·1 6 war, or t e vast maJority o t e prisoners were pi ots. Thus, the 
country would have to keep fighting for a settlement that would include 
the repatriation of those Americans. We now had a direct stake in the 
outcome of the fighting. After Pleiku, the American involvement became 
much deeper and a peace settlement more elusive. 
Naturally, the Vietnam War became an important political issue. 
The first teach-ins and protests began to occur in the spring of 1965. 7 
Johnson's foreign policy became even more interventionist with the Dominican 
Republic crisis in late April of 1965. A revolution in that country 
threatened an American-supported regime, and President Johnson believed 
the insurgents to be Communists. He sent in 22,000 troops to quell the 
I 
uprising. 8 Many observers argued that the rebels were democrats, not 
Communists, and claimed that Johnson did not have any Justification for 
this massive intrusion into another country's affairs. Equally disturbing 
to many was the President's refusal to work with the Organization of 
American States, an institution of which he once said, "It couldn't pour 
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piss out of a boot if the instructions were written on the heel. 119 
The American people, however, seemed supportive of Johnson's policies. 10 
Encouraged by this success at intervention, Johnson sought a vote of 
confidence for his policy in Vietnam. He asked for an additional $700 mil-
lion to support an American presence that had increased to 45,000 troops. 
Since the soldiers were already there, it was difficult for anyone to vote 
against giving them the supplies they needed to stay alive. As Chester 
Cooper says, "It was a neat political ploy. 1111 The bill passed the 
Senate with only three dissenters, and Johnson won his legislative endorse-
ment. None of the dissenters was Robert Kennedy. 12 
The time had come, however, for Kennedy to form some position on 
the war. He presented his ideas in two speeches, one on May 6, 1965, 
and the other on July 9, 1965. Since so little time separated the two 
speeches and because they are substantively similar, I shall discuss both 
of them in this chapter. First, I shall examine Kennedy's credibility 
at this time; second, I shall analyze the speeches·as efforts to provoke 
public discussion of U.S. policy in Vietnam; and, third, I shall review 
the reactions to the speeches and offer some reason for those reactions. 
Robert Kennedy remains an enigmatic figure even today. After his 
brother's death, feelings about him were even more mixed. In order to 
impose some structure on the public's perceptions concerning Kennedy, I 
shall examine several different factors that played major roles in 
creating the Robert Kennedy that the public saw. First, I shall examine 
the Kennedys' political inheritance and the mystique that seems to surround 
them. Next, I shall discuss the situation in the Democratic Party after 
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the death of John Kennedy, and, finally, I shall focus on RFK himself. 
While some of the statements about Kennedy cited here appeared after the 
two speeches to be discussed in this chapter, these comments aptly 
summarize American public perceptions of Kennedy from 1964 until his death. 
The Kennedy family exists as a unique phenomenon in American 
political history. Perhaps only the Adamses of the last century or 
the Roosevelts of this one rival the Kennedys as this country's premier 
political family. Literally hundreds of books document the peaks and 
valleys in the careers of various family members. What is important to 
this analysis, however, is the feeling in the country after the death 
of JFK. As the next in line, Robert Kennedy became the benefactor of 
this political inheritance. Kennedy himself expressed this idea at the 
Free University of West Berlin in June of 1964: 
There are many who felt ... that the torchbearer for 
a whole generation was gone; that an era was gone before 
its time ..•. But I have come to understand that the 
hope President Kennedy kindled isn't dead, but alive .. 
The torch still burns, and because it does, there remains 
for all of us a chan1~ to light up the tomorrows and 
brighten the future. 
Time magazine also recognized the existence of the Kennedy charisma. 
Their September 16, 1966, cover story examined RFK and discussed the 
family inheritance. In part, Time claimed, RFK's popularity rested on 
the legend surrounding John Kennedy: "Time seems to enhance rather than 
15 diminish the glow of his martyrdom." Time explained: 
In part, the phenomenon grows out of what Indiana's 
Senator Vance Hartke calls "a national guilt complex" 
over the assassination, a sort of politics of expiation whose 
chief beneficiary is Bobby. And in part, there 
is seemingly in the United States today a subterranean 
yen for a pseudomonarchical Kennedy "restorf6ion, 11 
with Bobby playing the role of exiled King. 
Newsweek also noted the adoration in a cover story: 
Yet if a senator must be judged by what he does, a 
Kennedy must be measured here and now for what he is: the 
inheritor of a magic name, an uncompleted mission, and 
a deep-roo17d family mystique of ambition and competition 
and power. 
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Directly above the story, Newsweek printed a picture of all three 
handsome brothers grinning at the reader. The charisma of one brother 
symbolically enfolded all of them. 
Whether all of this "hype" merely reported such a legacy or created 
it remains problematic. 'What happened, however, was that the Kennedy 
brothers transformed this legacy into raw political power. As Newseek 
wrote: 
Each Kennedy draws bigger crowds, attracts more mail, gets 
more speaking engagements, packs more people into galleries, 
runs a longer gauntlet of autograph hunters and Brownie 
snappers, and captures more and bigger1§eadlines than any 
man in public life except LBJ himself. 
One Senator put it this way: "I'm a practical politician. One of these 
19 boys might be President some day and it makes you kind of cautious." 
J 
Newsweek stated the matter succinctly: "In a Congress deep in debt to the 
length and strength of Lyndon Johnson's coattails, they LRobert and Edward 
Kennedy] alone have the power to lead a cohesive, continuing liberal 
. . 20 opposition. 
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This peculiar circumstance came about partially because of the 
strange situation in the Democratic Party after the death of John Kennedy. 
Robert Kennedy was generally recognized as the number two man in the 
Kennedy Administration, He was the Attorney General, a trying post in 
those ti.mes of civil rights turmoil, and he also had a major voice in 
foreign affairs. Moreover, the tone and the style of the Administration 
revolved around the Kennedy family. Yet when JFK died, the power and the 
Presidency went to Lyndon Johnson. Normally, a President can co-opt the 
other prominent leaders of the party, but Lyndon Johnson could not afford 
to alienate the Kennedys with less than a year before the next general 
election. Nor could Johnson capture the easy grace of his predecessor 
or reduce the "national guilt complex." In short, Johnson faced a Kennedy 
party within the Democratic Party, a very uncomfortable situation. 
A good relationship between Robert Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson might 
have eased this discomfort. Unfortunately, Kennedy and Johnson could 
barely stand one another in the best of times. Every source, regardless 
of political bias, seems to agree on this point. As Arthur Schlesinger 
writes: "No affections contaminated the relationship between the Vice-
President and the Attorney General. It was a pure case of mutual dislike. 1121 
Finally, we reach Robert Kennedy himself, a man of enormous contra-
dictions. Jules Feiffer's cartoon characterizations of a "good" Bobby 
and a "bad" Bobby sum up the situation well. Kennedy's image had a positive 
and a negative side, and the critic must examine both, for as Peiffer 
wrote: "If you want one Bobby to be your President, you will have to take 
both •.. For Bobbies are widely noted for their family unity. 1122 
In November of 1965, the Gallup organization published a poll on 
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23 Senator Robert Kennedy. While polls are not absolutely reliable, 
they are useful in providing a rough gauge of public opinion. This Gallup 
poll indicated that Americans liked Robert Kennedy for his intelligence, 
aggressiveness, and sincerity. They also liked him because he was a 
Kennedy. RFK ranked as the third most admired man in 1968. Only LBJ and 
Dwight Eisenhower ranked ahead of him, while such luminaries as Pope Paul VI 
and Hubert Humphrey fell behind. 24 
Beyond the poll data, however, Kennedy sparked something in Americans. 
To be sure, it was partially the family legacy. At the same time, 
There is an undeniable magnetism about him. He lacks 
Jack's graceful wit, and easy intellectuality, to be sure, 
and his reedy voice is oddly suggestive of a Bostonian 
Bugs Bunny. Yet his slight (5 ft. 10 in 165 lbs) wiry 
frame, his sandy, sun-bleached mane (to which a hand 
keeps straying nervously), his electric blue eyes all 
project an image that youngsters, in pa25icular, see as the embodiment of his brother's appeal. 
Apart from this charisma, Kennedy owned a record of success he could 
point to with pride. Kennedy came to the Senate at the age of 38 with 
fourteen years of public service behind him. He had managed all of his 
brother's winning campaigns and had won one himself against a tough 
26 opponent. When Kennedy retired as Attorney General, the New York Times, 
which had criticized RFK's appointment, praised Kennedy for having "eleva-
ted the standards of the office. 1127 Francis Biddle, FDR's Attorney 
General for four years, called Kennedy "certainly the finest Attorney 
28 General in the last twenty years, probably the best in this century." 
While much more about RFK's stint came out later, in particular his penchant 
for wiretapping, he owned good notices for his work as Attorney General 
when he spoke on Vietnam. 
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Much existed about Kennedy, though, that bothered people. Most 
prominent was concem for his "ruthless" character. Time summarized the 
negative point of view: 
Robert Kennedy, the ruthless kid brother, the vindictive 
Senate investigator of the 1950's who made no secret of his 
admiration for his one-time boss, the late Joe McCarthy, 
the heavy-handed hachet man of 1960 who ran Jack Kennedy's 
campaign the way Captain Ahab ran the Pequod, the glowering, 
omnipresent Attorney Gen• ·al who always seemed to be ~nder 
fire • • • • 29 
Gallup noted that people disliked the wa} he seemed to capitalize on the 
30 family name, his pushiness, and his hunger for power. Further, Gallup 
revealed that 40 percent of the people would like to see him as President 
d hil 45 uld d 15 h d . . 31 one ay, w e percent wo not an percent a no opinion. While 
this data presented strong negative opinions about RFK, it could also be 
taken as a measure of strength. In the December report, 58 percent of 
Americans did not want to see Hubert Humphrey become President. 32 When 
Jack Newfield first began to write his book on Kennedy, he wrote down the 
twenty adjectives that were "most often evoked" by other writers to 
describe Robert Kennedy. They sum up the contradictory feelings about 
the man: 
Intolerant, spoiled, vindictive, emotional, rude, moody, 
cold, simplistic, tense, pragmatic, authoritarian, compe-
titive, tough, loyal, courageous, honest, ambitious, rest-
less, moralistic, ruthless.33 
Kennedy's contradictory image had ramifications for his rhetoric 
on Vietnam. First, nearly everything RFK did or said on any subject, 
including Vietnam, that hinted at criticism of Johnson would be construed 
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in political terms. The prince would be seen as moving to wrest the 
crown from the usurper. This reality presented a significant rhetorical 
barrier for Robert Kennedy. Any attempt to provoke examination of 
U.S. policy in Vietnam would have to overcome this obstacle. Second, 
Johnson shared this perspective and quickly became paranoid. 34 Kennedy 
faced a competing rhetor of considerable power and resources. Third, any 
statement made by Kennedy generally received attention. Not only did 
RFK make headlines, but Johnson almost invariably sought to respond, thus 
heightening the effect of Kennedy's statements. Kennedy could reach the 
American public as very few people could. Though a junior Senator (96th 
in seniority), Kennedy "command[ed] a national following and extensive 
35 political resources." 
When that Senator rose on May 6, 1965, to speak on the Dominican 
Republic and Vietnam, he did not challenge the popular President. He had 
voted for the appropriations request, and he wished merely to explain that 
vote. Kennedy sought policy definition, not policy change. That definition, 
of course, revealed Kennedy's views on Vietnam. He justified his support 
of Johnson's request by stating that he voted for a course of ''honorable 
negotiation. 1136 Kennedy used a residue or elimination type of topical 
structure to outline the three possible courses of action in Vietnam. 
While the primary power of these arguments came from the pragmatic ramifi-
cations of each alternative, Kennedy clearly assigned a moral value to 
each choice. Thus, he sought to engage the audience in genuine argument 
by presenting a policy that was both morally and practically correct. 
Kennedy's thesis began the speech. He voted for the resolution 
"because our fighting forces in Vietnam and elsewhere deserve the unstinting 
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37 support of the American government and the American people." Kennedy 
realized the obstacle imposed by Johnson's "neat political ploy." 
Responding in kind, Kennedy refused to play the role of the isolated 
liberal critic. He defined his view of Johnson's policy through the 
words of Senator John Stennis, a conservative Southern Democrat: 
It is not a blank check •.•• We are backing up our 
men and also backing up the policy of the President. 
If he substantially enlarges or changes it, I would 38 
assume he would come back to us in one way or another. 
By using the Stennis quotation, Kennedy established the point that he 
did not want the war escalated, but he managed to associate his position 
with that of Senator Stennis and, thus, avoid any "liberal" taint. 
Kennedy then explored each of the three options in Vietnam: with-
drawal, enlargement, and negotiation. By the end of the speech, Kennedy 
left the audience with only one possible option, negotiation. 
The withdrawal discussion ran for only one paragraph, and this in 
itself indicated the futility of the option. The paragraph employed a 
climax construction, with each sentence presenting another, even more 
terrible ramification of withdrawal. He concluded this section by claiming 
that withdrawal would "gravely--perhaps irreparably--weaken the democratic 
• • • A • 1139 position in sia. The language of the discussion set the tone for the 
examinations of the other options. Kennedy strongly condemned possible 
results of withdrawal. While these results would have pragmatic impli-
cations for American policy, Kennedy encouraged the audience to view this 
option through a moral perspective. Withdrawal would repudiate "commitments 
undertaken and confirmed by three administrations. ,,4,0 We would be 
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acquiescing to "the Communist domination of South Asia--a domination 
unacceptable to the peoples of the area. We would be engaging in 
an "explicit and gross betrayal" of our friends in Vietnam. All of these 
ramifications violated Americans' values. The language--"betrayal," 
"repudiation"--provided a moral evaluation of each implication and thus 
a moral evaluation of the policy option. Following Johnson's lead, 
Kennedy condemned withdrawal in moral terms. 42 
Escalation was the next alternative examined. RFK argued that this 
would be a "deep and terrible decision."43 Given the importance of the 
option, Kennedy gave it more attention. Again, he used vivid language· 
to paint a dark picture of the possible consequences of escalation. In 
this section, the discussion became more specifically pragmatic; Kennedy 
argued that enlarging the war would be a disastrous policy choice. First, 
however, he engaged in refutation. He wanted to make clear that America 
could not win the war through bombing alone. He relied on his own per-
sonal authority and the power of his language to make this point. 
Bombing was "remote and antiseptic" and, as all fans of World War II 
movies knew, wars were not won by "remote and antiseptic" means. 44 He 
labelled the hope that the war could be won in such a fashion a "self-
delusion. ,,4S The second part of his argument against escalation detailed 
in yet another climax construction the chilling consequences of enlargement. 
Comparing Vietnam to Korea, Kennedy contended that Vietnam had a much 
greater potential for disaster. The terrain presented more difficulties, 
the Chinese and their "inexhaustible reserves of ground troops" still 
inhabited the scene, and such an effort could lead to the use of nuclear 
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46 weapons and, thus, result in the Third World War. The argument ended 
with the ultimate threat of the modern age, a threat that combined 
pragmatic and moral justification for rejecting the policy of escalation. 
Before presenting his policy choice and, presumably, the President's 
policy, Kennedy briefly summarized his arguments, and this summary 
clearly indicated the dual nature of his strategy. He stated: 
Both of these courses--withdrawal and enlargement--are 
contrary to the interests~~ the United States and to 
humanity's hope for peace. 
America's interests and values demanded a rejection of both of these 
alternatives. 
Finally, Kennedy reached the policy he preferred, "the policy we are 
48 endorsing today." Kennedy portrayed the results of this policy in a 
revealing way. He did not argue that this choice would result in tangible 
benefits for the people of America. None of the advantages he cited 
would accrue to Americans. Instead, Kennedy maintained that this alter-
native would lead to a reduction in "the intervention and presence of 
foreign troops and ideologies" in Vietnam. 49 It would lead to develop-
mental efforts, which would cost American taxpayers money, but which 
would aid the people of the area. Kennedy assumed the United States was 
in Vietnam primarily to help the Vietnamese, not to stop Communism or any 
other goal of that sort. In the process, of course, America might well 
stop Communism. That, however, was not the primary goal. Kennedy urged 
Americans to act in accord with their values, with their desire to see 
others attain those values, not with a desire for direct profit. The 
only sure reward for America would come from the conscience of the country. 
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Kennedy followed this depiction of the benefits of negotiation 
with a section praising President Johnson's efforts to negotiate. RFK 
50 applauded Johnson for his courtesy and his open-mindedness. Given 
the obstacles cited above, this may have been a shrewd maneuver. RFK 
completed this strategy by stating that he, "along with a number of 
th S t II h d d · d th war wi· th the Presi· dent. 51 o er ena ors, a iscusse e In order 
to avoid any perception that he was challenging the President, Kennedy 
praised Johnson and presented himself as just another Senator seeking 
to do his duty. He hoped to remove the personality issue by doing this 
and, thus, be able to concentrate on policy matters. It was a tactic 
he would use again and again, with varying degrees of success. Since 
he seemed to be agreeing with LBJ in this speech, the effort to applaud 
his policy had more credibility. 
In this attempt to praise Johnson, Kennedy blamed the failure of 
the negotiations on the North Vietnamese. He very carefully defined the 
role of the U.S. military in Vietnam. While sounding tough, "we must 
show Hanoi that it cannot win the war ••. ," he restricted the military 
by arguing that they should only be used to make political action possible. 52 
Kennedy asserted: "I believe we have erred for some time in regarding 
Vietnam as a purely military problem when in its essential aspects, it 
53 is also a political and diplomatic problem." By including himself as 
one who has erred, he revealed another strategy that he would use through-
out his Vietnam discourse. When he admitted his errors in judgement, he 
made it easier for others to do the same. He also made himself a peer 
of the audience. He, too, was plagued with doubts about a war he was once 
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so sure about, but he was willing to admit mistakes and change policy. 
Even a Kennedy could be fallible. RFK ended the Vietnam section of the 
speech by noting the deficiencies of the present bill. It did not do 
enough for the people of South Vietnam who needed reasons to fight as 
well as material with which to fight. Presumably, Kennedy's new insight 
into the nature of the problem demanded this kind of policy. So, while 
fallible, Kennedy also was an experienced leader. He may have erred 
before, but now he knew the path out of the darkness. In order to succeed, 
American policy had to give the South Vietnamese "the hope of a better life 
which alone can fortify them for the labor and sacrifices ahead."54 
Pragmatic progress depended upon moral virtue. Without hope, the people 
of South Vietnam could not succeed. American policy must give that hope. 
It must act in accord with American values. 
The rest of the speech dealt with the Dominican Republic, but 
three major themes applied to the situation in Vietnam. First, Kennedy 
again tried to find some common ground with President Johnson. He had more 
difficulty locating a patch on this issue. Kennedy limited his approval 
to Johnson's "determination to prevent the establishment of a new Communist 
state in this hemisphere."55 He began to disagree with the President 
when it came to the means to reach this end. His second and third themes 
discussed the means. The President, Kennedy argued, could only strengthen 
the Organization of American States by using it. This second theme of 
peaceful international cooperation to solve problems applied to the 
predominantly unilateral American effort in Vietnam. Finally, Kennedy 
contested the claim that the revolutionaries were Communists and came 
close to violating Cold War dogma concerning Communists? Even if some 
of the revolutionaries were Communists, that was not reason enough, 
Kennedy maintained, to condemn the entire revolution: 
Our determination to stop the Communist revolution in 
the hemisphere must not be construed as opposition to 
popular uprisings against injustice and oppression just 
because the targets of such popular uprisings say they 
are Communist-inspired or Communist5!ed or even because 
known Communists take part in them. 
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Such words established a basis for attacking Johnson's policy in Vietnam, 
for they described the situation in Vietnam. 
Several of the rhetorical strategies that appeared in the May 6 
speech laid a foundation for Robert Kennedy's future discourse. First, 
Kennedy used the residue or elimination structure in a number of speeches. 
This inductive approach created the semblance of a dialogue with the 
audience. They participated with Kennedy in examining and discarding 
various policy options. This organizational pattern was a good strategic 
choice for Kennedy. Most people feel more inclined to lower their 
defenses and engage in public policy discussion with a speaker who allows 
them at least a sense of participation in such deliberations. Kennedy 
treated his audience as peers, not as inferiors. Kennedy's admission of 
error regarding Vietnam also reinforced this aura of equality and this 
admission was the second major strategy of the speech that was to appear 
again and again. Kennedy admitted fallibility and if he, the brother 
of the martyred President, could admit error, then anyone could feel more 
comfortable admitting a mistake in judgment about Vietnam. Such a change 
in attitude made policy change more possible. Finally, and most importantly, 
Kennedy argued that Right made Might. He assumed that we were in Vietnam 
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to help the South Vietnamese (and all Vietnamese). Thus, the best, 
the most efficient way to achieve that goal, was the policy that actually 
used American values. Logically, one could extend Kennedy's argument 
a bit, and contend that even if we were in Vietnam to save our own skins, 
our skins depended upon the will of the South Vietnamese to fight the 
war. Clearly, Kennedy did not come close to a moral condemnation of 
the war. He did, however, define the success of the war in moral terms. 
He made the values of hope, self-determination, and a better life the 
measuring stick of American prggress, for "success will depend not only 
on protecting the people from aggression but on giving them the hope 
of a better life which alone can fortify them for the labor and sacrifice 
ahead. 1157 
While Johnson may have hoped the passage of the appropriations request 
would signal widespread support for the Administration's policy and 
quiet the debate, nothing of the sort happened. Instead, as U.S. News 
and World Report noted, liberals in the Democratic Party began carefully, 
58 but firmly, to articulate an alternative foreign policy. While few 
strong disagreements as yet existed, the alternative departed from the 
Johnson line on a number of points. U.S. News argued that the Kennedy 
brothers provided the liberals with a legitimacy that they might otherwise 
have lacked. 59 Robert Kennedy's first formal speech to the Senate on 
J 23 1965 di.d th. d · 1 th · 60 une , , no ing to ispe at perception. He discussed nuclear 
proliferation and, although the speech was not expressly critical of the 
Johnson Administration, it "was filled with somber quotations from John F. 
Kennedy about nuclear proliferation and carried the inescapable implication 
that Johnson was not doing enough to stop it. Johnson was so annoyed 
that he struck his disarmament proposals from his own pending address 
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to the United Nations lest someone think he was following Robert Kennedy's 
1 d "61 ea. Kennedy's speech was acclaimed. Newsweek praised the speech, 
noting that the Senate galleries were jammed and that more than fifty 
62 Senators were present. This address is an excellent example of Kennedy's 
drawing power. Many Senators were probably concerned about nuclear 
proliferation, but few could receive nationwide coverage, much less the 
attendance of fifty of their colleagues, when they spoke on the subject. 
Despite this slowly growing criticism, Johnson continued to do pretty 
much as he pleased in the foreign policy arena, and Vietnam proved no 
exception. 
As Kennedy's concerns about the war deepened, he accepted an invita-
tion to address the graduating class of the International Police Academy 
in Washington, D.C. The Academy specialized in the tactics of counterin-
surgency, and Kennedy used this forum to indicate the necessity of 
political action as part of an overall solution for an insurgent war. 
Kennedy considered himself an expert in this area and possessed a deep 
interest in the subject. Early in his brother's administration, Kennedy 
advocated counterinsurgency constantly. He read Mao and Che Guevera and 
sought to incorporate the ideas of the famous British guerrilla fighter 
and diplomat, Sir Robert Thompson, into a new American fighting force, 
63 the Green Berets. Even at the time, however, Kennedy did not envision 
counterinsurgency as a solely military effort. Jack Newfield explains: 
It is necessary to recall now that, back in 1961, counter-
insurgency was regarded by men like the Kennedys .•. to be 
an original, flexible, and even humanistic concept to 
remedy the Dulles nostrums of massive retaliation and 
nuclear retaliation. And that social and political reform 
was an integral part of the concept. Counterinsurgency 
was in harmony with the ethos and the style6~f the 
New Frontier: fresh, tough, and practical. 
The speech at the International Police Academy sought to reinvigorate 
the original concept of counterinsurgency. 
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Kennedy again went to great lengths to avoid conflict with Lyndon 
Johnson and to focus attention on the substance of the address. In fact, 
he went to such lengths that he drew more attention to the politics of 
Vietnam and created textual problems for the critic. 65 Adam Walinsky, 
Kennedy's primary speechwriter, wrote the speech. It contained a number 
of passages directly critical of LBJ's Vietnam policy, Kennedy approved 
the text and sent copies to the media. Within the hour, he was receiving 
phone calls from excited news people, questioning him about the break 
with Johnson. That night, Kennedy deleted several of the sharpest 
passages. The text, however, was already out. The changes became the 
story, and the speech faded in importance. Nevertheless, this speech was 
important, for· it provided a theoretical base for Kennedy's later attacks 
on Johnson's policy. 
Throughout the May 6 speech in the Senate RFK asserted that the 
political portion of an American counterinsurgency effort should dominate 
the military action. That short speech, however, failed to develop that 
argument fully. The July 9 speech at the International Police Academy 
explained Kennedy's views on counterinsurgency. While he was careful 
to remain on the theoretical level, the concepts developed in the speech 
could not help but be applied to Vietnam, despite RFK's efforts to mute 
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any criticism of the Johnson Administration. This speech, then, argued 
that in order to win a guerrilla war, a government must be "effective and 
- - 66 responsive to the needs of l_it~ ../ people." 
Kennedy began the speech with an introduction complimentary to the 
audience. More than in the other Vietnam speeches, Kennedy felt compelled 
to adapt to the immediate audience, instead of speaking to the country. 
Still, those deletions designed to placate the President made it clear 
that Kennedy expected the American people to listen. Thus, he spent a 
great deal of time Justifying and defining his topic. He wished to discuss 
"revolutionary wars, sometimes called 'wars of national liberation' or 
67 insurgency" because these wars were "a central concern to all the world." 
Kennedy used authority evidence and examples to buttress this claim. He 
quoted John Kennedy dismissing all-out war as unlikely due to nuclear 
weapons and claiming, therefore, that guerrilla wars were the challenge 
of the future. Robert Kennedy followed this quotation with a series of 
examples citing a number of such wars. Kennedy then made a curious state-
ment on Vietnam. He said "that Vietnam has become more and more an open 
military conflict as well l_as a political on~/, in which military action 
on our part is essential just to allow the government to act politically. 1168 
This statement left a lot of questions. Kennedy obviously expected some 
political action in Vietnam. Yet he seemed to be saying that the military 
should play a larger role in Vietnam than was to be expected in the "normal" 
guerrilla war. This paragraph defined the Vietnam War as partially outside 
the concerns of the speech and as partially inside the speech. Kennedy never 
clarified this point. The number of examples from Vietnam, however, lend 
weight to the argument that he meant these concepts to apply to that war. 
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Kennedy's entire introduction reflected the ambivalence present in 
the statement that directly concerned Vietnam. That ambivalence certainly 
reflected the confusion that had started to permeate the .American 
people. It also muddied his strategic purposes. On the other hand, 
Kennedy wished to focus the attention of the audiences, particularly the 
national audience, on the substance of the speech and not on the political 
controversy. Kennedy's emphasis on the importance and the nature of the 
topic was a strategy aimed at the national audience. The immediate 
audience, after the course at the Academy, knew the importance and the 
character of an insurgent war. They did not need this introductory 
section of the speech. Kennedy's justification of the topic sought to 
convince a national audience that he spoke on insurgent warfare simply 
because of the importance and timeliness of the issue, not because he 
wished to score political points. This strategy allowed Kennedy to 
deemphasize the political import of his remarks and, he hoped, open a 
debate about the nature of the .American commitment in Vietnam with the 
national audience, RFK's use of his brother's words accomplished exactly 
the opposite. In all fairness, such quotations had the potential to 
create public re-examination of policy in Vietnam. They presented an 
audience that revered the dead President with the possibility that he 
would have disapproved of the present course in Vietnam. The auotations, 
however, also carried the inescapable implication that LBJ had departed 
from the Kennedy legacy. The quotations redirected the attention of the 
audience to political matters and inevitably brought up questions about 
Robert Kennedy's intentions. Would he challenge Johnson in 1968? How 
could he not challenge the President if he thought the President's 
policies were wrong? Yet he claimed he would not challenge Johnson. 
The questions lingered and gnawed at RFK's credibility. 
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This speech also differed from the other Vietnam speeches because, 
for the most part, Kennedy played the role of teacher. As noted earlier, 
he treated the audience as equals in the May 6 Senate address, and I shall 
argue that he did the same in most of the other speeches. In this effort, 
however, he detailed the lessons that the United States and these students 
could learn from guerrilla wars past. While Kennedy still attempted to 
create some participation through the use of questions to simulate a 
dialogue, he basically took charge of the situation and presented a lecture 
on insurgent warfare. The role, of course, was a natural one to play at 
a commencement ceremony. 
Kennedy began the lecture by creating identification with the immediate 
audience and thus reminding the national audience of America's revolu-
tionary heritage. Kennedy argued that it would violate "our deepest 
traditions to oppose any genuine popular revolution."69 But, he pointed 
out, the Soviet Union and China have fomented aggressive wars of national 
liberation, wars that offered "the greatest threat to the world order of 
free and independent states to which all nations pledged themselves in 
the charter of the United Nations."70 In other words, the charter of the 
United Nations certified efforts to oppose Communist aggression. This 
paragraph is an excellent example of Kennedy's attempt to force the 
audience to rethink Vietnam policy. Kennedy managed to include America's 
revolutionary heritage, anti-communism, and the United Nations charter 
into a vague, but coherent policy on insurgent warfare. Kennedy was 
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reaching out to all parts of the populace. 
The next paragraph presented the means for dealing with these wars 
and constituted the thesis he would argue that day. RFK stated that 
political, internal factors governed the outcome of these conflicts. 
He maintained that since the essence of these wars was political, they 
71 could only be won "by an idea and a faith, by promise and performance." 
The last sentence of the paragraph succinctly summed up Kennedy's posi-
tion: "Governments resist such Lrevolutionary/ challenges only by being 
1172 effective and responsive to the needs of their people. Immediately, 
Kennedy defined what he meant by effective government, and it did not 
necessarily mean the American model. He argued for pluralism, maintaining 
that only the force of example could spread democracy. RFK assumed, 
probably correctly, that both audiences would respond to the value of 
self-determination. 
As in the May 6 speech, Kennedy sought to ground American policy in 
American values. The most pragmatic policy in these wars, in fact the 
only pragmatic policy, consisted of freedom and democracy, of the use of 
the American values that the national audience cherished. Unlike the 
May 6 speech, however, Kennedy then began to specify what he meant by 
this policy. He argued that technological innovations had obscured the 
essentially political nature of the struggle. 73 Kennedy had little faith 
that technology alone could win these wars. Instead, the Senator promoted 
the power of an idea, and he provided two examples to illustrate the 
kinds of actions he had in mind: The British, who did not use political 
tools in Cyprus to complement their overwhelming military force and failed, 
and Magsaysay of the Philippines, who possessed inadequate military force, 
but who prevailed through the use of political methods. 74 Kennedy 
strategically provided the listener with a positive and a negative 
example of the importance of politics. 
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Senator Kennedy asked two questions as a prelude to the next part 
of the speech, and these questions worked effectively because they might 
well have come from the audience. 75 Kennedy anticipated the logical 
search for reasons for the success of political methods, expressed those 
questions, and made them the next topics to be discussed. 
Initially, he argued that the very nature of military force precluded 
its sole, successful use in a guerrilla war. In short, succinct 
sentences, reinforced by a hypothetical example, Kennedy maintained that 
military force destroys, and a government cannot destroy its own people 
and retain any claim to their loyalty. While this may sound simple, 
the hypothetical example, which described the situation in South Vietnam 
whether he intended it to or not, indicated that governments often forget 
this basic maxim. 76 Kennedy added more proof by telling the famous story 
77 of Napoleon's troubles in maintaining control over "conquered" lands. 
RFK consistently associated military power with negative terms throughout 
h h . 11 . h · i 78 t e speec, especia yin tis sect on. He also elaborated upon the 
Philippine example and quoted a noted guerrilla expert, General Edward 
Lansdale, to buttress his case. 79 In delineating the example, RFK 
provided details of Magsaysay's actions in the Philippines as a model 
for other governments to follow. This specifics reinforced his case 
and his ethos as an expert. 
The next paragraph added another facet to the argument. Military 
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force alone was inadequate because the other side used both military 
force and political methods. Kennedy quickly enumerated three Communist 
. h h. h d d · 1 d. v· 80 countries were tis a occurre, inc u 1ng 1etnam. Another 
hypothetical example that described Vietnam made his case: 
They /the insurgent~/ have thus entered into direct 
competition with the established government. When the 
defenders have ignored reform, the hopes of the people 
could only center on the insurgents. And when a 
victorious army is followed by landlords collecting 
back rent from the peasants, we should not wonder that 
the insur§~nts often attract the allegiance of the 
peasants. 
Kennedy then began using repetition. He obviously wanted to make 
his point as clearly as possible and in as many ways as possible. He 
purported to offer another reason why military force could not work, but 
in actuality he merely restated his thesis in a slightly altered form. 
He claimed that military force could not give hope, again associating 
the military with negative terms. Only hope, Kennedy argued, could cause 
1 d h ·f f . 82 peop e to un ergot e sacr1 ices necessary or victory. He again 
83 referred to the Philippines and also cited the British effort in Malaya. 
RFK cit~d more authority evidence as support for the examples, and this 
particular piece of evidence emanated from a good source, George 
Marshall: "Let's not talk about this matter too much in military terms; 
84 to do so might make it a military problem." This quotation revealed 
another strategy that Kennedy frequently used. He cited a number of 
military authorities who agreed with his position. Such evidence had the 
advantage of being reluctant testimony. People who argued contrary to 
their perceived self-interest would have a stronger impact on the audience 
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than most authorities. Such citations might very well shake the 
complacency of people who believed that the government experts were 
doing a good job of running the war and that the ordinary citizen should 
support such experts. 
Robert Kennedy concluded this section of the speech by outlining the 
basic assumptions behind his ideas and refuting opposing positions. Using 
the words of President Kennedy, RFK argued that a government should view 
. . i h 11 h 1 · · 1 BS insurgents as cit zens w o must eventua y reenter t e po itica process. 
The strategic advantages and liabilities of JFK quotations were discussed 
above. After summarizing with this general quotation, Kennedy rebutted 
86 the possible obJections to his position. Again, he made extensive 
use of specific examples. People cannot easily refute what has actually 
happened, and this speech provided a great many instances of the success 
of predominantly political programs in revolutionary wars. 
More examples and restatement marked the rest of the speech, but one 
example in particular stood out. Kennedy told the story of a village in 
Vietnam where the women were forced to walk around a rich man's land in 
order to get to the well for their water. This practice had continued 
for hundreds of years, but the Viet Cong ended it as soon as they entered 
87 the village and thereby won the loyalty of the peasants. This example 
was superb. It presented the same story often seen in moralistic melo-
dramas: The cruel, heartless, rich landlord oppressed poor but good 
people and finally lost in the end. The little guy, the hero, the Viet 
Cong, won. Pragmatically, the very simplicity of the action was appealing 
and illustrated the sensitivity to political concerns that Kennedy sought. 
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The fact that the example came from Vietnam was probably no accident. 
Kennedy then listed many of the actions that a government could take to 
win the loyalty of its people. He emphasized the role of young people 
in bringing about th~ needed reforms. This emphasis reinforced his credi-
bility among the young graduates and among the young in America. He 
accorded both groups a high sense of responsibility. 88 
Finally, the conclusion returned to the inunediate audience. He 
reminded them of their responsibility to implement these ideas in their 
own countries. The enumeration of good political actions, ending with 
a reference to the path story, added unity to the speech and sullllllarized 
th . . d 89 e main i eas. Kennedy also traced the etymology of the word "police," 
reinforcing the political role of the police in an unusual and interesting 
manner. After all, if "police" and "politics" come from the same root, 
then police, these police, should take political action. 9° Kennedy ended 
by quoting his brother's inaugural address and rededicating himself to 
the "long, twilight struggle" that these wars will demand. 91 This parti-
cular quotation was an interesting choice, for it is the only pessimistic 
statement in the inaugural. Such a choice implied that Robert Kennedy 
may have harbored some doubts about the future. 
This speech, while an extension of the arguments made on May 6, contri-
buted some new rhetorical strategies to Kennedy's repertoire. First, 
RFK sought to extend and prove his concepts of counterinsurgency. As a 
matter of fact, he tried to give his theory the validity of a natural 
law. He argued that the political should always dominate the military in 
an insurgent war. He provided a number of examples to "prove" his law. 
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Thus, any policy that did not put the political first was doomed to 
fail. In other words, Right made Might all of the time in revolutionary 
wars, and American policy should conform to American values. Second, 
Kennedy initiated the extensive use of authority evidence and, in parti-
cular, he began to quote his brother on this subject. The use of these 
authorities bolstered Kennedy's credibility. He was not a lonely 
radical on a quixotic quest. A lot of important people agreed with him, 
so maybe the audience should listen. Finally, this speech displayed 
Kennedy's characteristically clear organization. A sound structure 
existed in nearly every speech he gave and it made them easy to understand. 
This speech may have had too much repetition, but no one could complain 
that they couldn't catch his main points. 
Unfortunately for Kennedy, neither one of these speeches had a very 
large impact. The May 6, 1965, speech disappeared without a trace. The 
New York Times made no mention of the speech; they reported only the vote 
and the dissenting votes of Gruening, Morse, and Nelson. 92 The Washington 
Post was the only paper or magazine to mention the speech, noting that it 
93 seemed to sum up the "subdued, almost mournful mood" of the Senate. 
Most Senators, the Post added, wanted only an extension of the present effort, 
not an escalation. No other source covered the speech, though U.S. News 
and World Report mentioned the Dominican Republic section of the speech 
when it discussed the liberal Democratic foreign policy alternative. 94 
The May 6 address did not reach a national audience. 
The July 9, 1965, speech received more attention, primarily 
because of the political controversy over the deletions. The New York Times 
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ran a headline stating "Kennedy urges Political Stance. 1195 The 
Times presented Kennedy's criticisms of Johnson, then noted the deletions. 
It also reported on a press conference Kennedy held: 
I 
Talking to reporters after the speech, Mr. Kennedy stressed 
that any criticism had been made of policies of the past 
20 years, including the Administration of his brother in 
which he had been pers~gally involved. "We can all do 
better," he concluded. 
This extemporaneous remark continued the strategy of assuming responsi-
bility himself for the mistakes made in Vietnam. This assumption 
appeared in nearly all of Kennedy's remarks about the war. Other media 
that covered the speech concentrated on Kennedy's deletions, not on 
the substance of the address or comments made in this press conference. 
Time's article, "Saying It and Not Saying It," was typical. Noting 
that "Robert F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson have a history of mutual 
antagonism," Time analyzed the political fallout of the speech. It 
97 ignored the arguments. 
Why did Kennedy's remarks fail to have much impact? Clearly, 
Kennedy failed to disrupt the belief system of his audience. He did 
not confront the audience with any violations of its values. While he 
sought to ground American policy in American values, the values he 
discussed were not central to most people's existence. Self-determination, 
voting rights, and capital improvements for Vietnam were important, 
but ignoring these values did not cause trauma in the audience. More-
over, it seemed as if Johnson was doing what Kennedy and the people of 
the country wanted. In 1965, Johnson was the proud owner of a 70 percent 
98 approval rating. That rating dipped slightly to a still respectable 
majority of 60 percent when solely foreign policy was considerea. 99 
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In November of 1965, 60 percent of the public said the American troops were 
doing "very well" in Vietnam. 10° Fifty percent, however, agreed that 
"our struggle in Vietnam will not be won on the battlefield--but in 
101 the minds of the native people living in that country." Fifty-nine 
percent of Americans believed that the United States "is likely to be 
more successful in winning the loyalty of the native people in that 
102 country." Overall, 48 percent of the country approved of Johnson's 
h dl . f h h"l 1 28 d" d lOJ an ing o t e war w 1 eon y percent isapprove. Clearly, the 
public thought that a political solution was important, but felt that 
Johnson was already pursuing the policy. Kennedy seemed to be splitting 
hairs with Johnson, and he provided no compelling rationale for changing 
policy or even for speaking. He assumed that the audience would be 
willing to argue about a new policy for Vietnam when in actuality they 
saw little wrong with the present policy. As Powers noted in a conunent 
cited in the previous chapter, the opponents of the war needed to specify 
the cost of the war, and Robert Kennedy failed to do that. With no 
good justification for speaking, Kennedy found himself facing the poli-
tical questions that sapped his credibility and revived discussion of 
his ambitious and ruthless nature. The lack of a specified cost of the 
war prevented Kennedy from achieving genuine argument. 
These speeches, however, laid some groundwork for future discourse. 
First, Kennedy argued that the war should be judged by moral criteria. 
At this point, he was not specific about the ways the war violated the 
criteria nor did he focus on important values. Still, these speeches 
conditioned the audience to view the war through a moral perspective 
and cleared the way for a stronger moral attack on the war. Bound to 
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this perspective was the assumption that values superseded pragmatic 
considerations. Second, Robert Kennedy began to assume control over 
the Kennedy legacy. While the JFK quotations may have had a mixed 
impact in these speeches, their use asserted Robert Kennedy's right to 
decide if his brother would have approved of LBJ's Vietnam policy. 
Until this time, Kennedy had been content not to challenge Johnson publicly 
when he wrapped himself in John Kennedy's credibility. Since Johnson 
often justified his policy by relying on the precedent of John Kennedy, 
Robert Kennedy's tentative rejection of that claim is significant, for 
only a brother of the dead President who had been close to his decision 
k . h d h d . b · 1 . k h h · k l04 ma ing a t e ere i 1 ity to ma e sue a c arge stic. Given 
America's reverence for JFK, this rhetorical strategy had the potential 
to disturb the complacency about U.S. policy in Vietnam audience. If 
John Kennedy would not have approved, perhaps the policy needed to be 
rethought. Finally, RFK introduced the theme of personal responsibility. 
He admitted he had been wrong about Vietnam, and this admission made 
it easier for others to do the same. It also foreshadowed Kennedy's 
effort to make everyone responsible for the war, for he had to admit 
his own culpability before he could charge others with the same guilt. 
While these two speeches failed to have a major impact on policy or on 
opinion about the war, they introduced strategies that possessed the 
potential to accomplish those goals. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
A COALITION GOVERID1ENT 
The controversy over the July 5th speech silenced Kennedy, as 
did the press of other responsibilities. He made no further formal 
statements about the war in 1965. Questions about Vietnam, however, 
popped up whenever he met with the press or with college students. 
Kennedy consistently displayed a tendency to say exactly what he felt in 
these situations regardless of the public position he wanted to main-
tain. Such was the case at the University of Southern California on 
November 5, 1965. Kennedy defended youthful demonstrators and trod 
on controversial ground: 
RFK: If a person feels strongly and wants to ... burn 
his draft card ••.. I don't agree with it personally 
but I think that obviously /_is/ the way /_chosen by/ some-
body that feels very strongly about this matter •... 
Press: What about giving blood to the North Vietnamese? 
RFK: I think that's a good idea. 
Press: Is that going too far? 
RFK: If we've given all the blood that is needed to the 
South Vietnamese. I'm in favor of giving /to/ anybody 
who needs blood. I'm in favor of them having blood. 
Press: Even to the North Vietnamese? 
RFK: Yes. 1 
These remarks echoed around the country. The New York Daily News 
recommended that Kennedy "go the whole hog" and join the Communist 
2 forces. The Chicago Tribune ran a cartoon showing Kennedy standing on 
a coffin marked "American Dead" carrying a placard indicating his willing-
3 ness to help the enemy. Many seemed to share the opinion of Barry 
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Goldwater: "It was closer to treason than it was to academic freedom."4 
For a man who possessed a will to win with any means, these remarks 
appeared out of character. They certainly revealed his deep ambivalence 
about the war, for he seldom shied away from any tactic that might 
bring victory closer. Giving blood to the North Vietnamese was not a 
move designed to defeat them. 
Shortly after these statements, Senator Kennedy left for an extended 
visit to Latin America. This trip was interesting for a couple of 
reasons. First, while Kennedy defended the Administration's Vietnam 
policy abroad, the events surrounding the trip revealed the depth of 
the antagonism between Kennedy and Johnson. When Kennedy attended the 
routine State Department briefing before the trip, he found an 
extraordinarily hostile Jack Hood Vaughn, the assistant secretary for 
inter-American affairs. After increasingly bitter exchanges over Latin 
American policy, Kennedy told Vaughn: 
Well, Mr. Vaughn, let me get this straight. You~re saying 
what the Alliance for Progress has come down to is that if 
you have a military takeover, outlaw political parties, 
close down the congress, put your political opponents in 
jail, and take away the basic freedoms of the people, 
you can get all the American aid that you want. But, 
if you mess around with an American oil company, we'll 
cut you off without a penny. Is that ri§ht? Is that what 
the Alliance for Progress comes down to? 
Vaughn agreed. Kennedy left for Latin America and a tumultuous reception. 
Kennedy's name provided one reason for such a greeting. His 
rhetoric on the tour, however, received quite a bit of attention and 
deserves some considertion. His speeches consistently stressed the 
theme of personal responsibility: 
If you object to American aid, have the courage to say 
so. But you are not going to solve your own problems 
by blaming the United States anft avoiding your own 6 
personal responsibility to do something about them. 
In this Latin American trip, and in a later trip to South Africa, 
Kennedy placed considerable emphasis on the responsibility of each 
individual person for the policies of their respective countries. 
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This argument for personal moral accountability for the actions of 
government had already appeared in the rhetoric of the New Left, 
particularly in the Port Huron statement of the Students for a Democra-
7 tic Society, and it would soon appear in Kennedy's Vietnam speeches. 
At this time, RFK was not prepared to subject Americans to the same 
standards as these foreign students. 
While Kennedy toured Latin America, the Johnson Administration 
became increasingly preoccupied with Vietnam. Nineteen sixty-five saw 
an enormous escalation of the American effort in Vietnam. The Admini-
stration committed 185,600 troops to the war, and nearly 1400 of 
8 those soldiers died, bringing the total casualty count to over 1600, 
Congress planned to appropriate $12 billion specifically for the war 
' 
in 1966, dollars supplemented by other defense funding that found its 
9 way into the war effort. The Johnson Administration spent 1965 
making the Vietnam war into an American war. 
This change did not achieve the desired results. Despite the 
massive effort, Secretary of Defense McNamara's figures revealed an 
increase, rather than a decrease, in the North Vietnamese infiltration 
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10 rates into South Vietnam. Shortly after Thanksgiving, American forces 
fought regular units of the North Vietnamese army for the first time, 11 
On the political front, Johnson attempted to cope with seven different 
governments in Saigon and a growing American protest movement. 12 In 
August of 1965, the usually supportive media damaged Johnson's cause 
by televising the dramatic burning of Cam Re by Marines with cigarette 
lighters. 13 The good guys seemed to be doing the same things as the 
bad guys. In November, two people emulated the Buddhists of South 
Vietnam by inunolating themselves, one in front of the Pentagon and the 
other before the United Nations. 14 A major protest also occurred 
that month, with twenty thousand people marching to the White House to 
express their opposition to the war. 15 In August of 1965, seventy 
percent of a Gallup poll agreed that the situation was getting worse 
in Vietnam, though they still maintained that the American soldiers 
were doing weli. 16 Finally, on December 5, 1965, Robert Kennedy 
presented Lyndon Johnson with an early Christmas present, a call for 
a bombing halt in North Vietnam. Kennedy spent the rest of the inter-
view defending Johnson. 17 Johnson decided that Christmas was a propitious 
time for a "peace offensive." 
As with almost anything Lyndon Johnson attempted, the peace 
offensive was a spectacle. He rushed Administration spokesmen to countries 
18 all over the world. He gave several speeches advertising his willingness 
to negotiate. Most important, he stopped the bombing for twenty-seven 
19 days. Unfortunately for his effort, he did not halt the largest 
American ground offensive of the war, an attack that began the day 
after the bombing halt started. 20 Hanoi was not impressed, and the 
war dragged on. By late January, Johnson's generals were exerting 
tremendous pressure on Johnson to resume the bombing raids. Kennedy, 
hearing from McNamara about the conflict, sought to bolster Johnson's 
resolve by giving him a copy of Bruce Catton's Never Call Retreat, 
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21 with marked passages discussing Lincoln's problems with his generals. 
Johnson responded with a warm note and four days later resumed the 
bombing. On January 31, Kennedy reacted with a short speech on the 
Senate floor. 
He began the speech by emphasizing his support for the President. 
The only reason he provided for that support, however, was the fact 
that "the President had made his decision. 1122 His disagreement with 
the resumption was not subtle; he said: "obviously, the resumption of 
the bombing is not a policy. 1123 Kennedy's clear attack on a specific 
Administration policy was a first. So was the strong language Kennedy 
used to condemn the bombing: 
For if we regard bombing as the answer in Vietnam--we 
are headed straight for disaster. In the past, bombing 
has not proved a decisive weapon against a rural economy--
or against a guerrilla economy. And the temptation now 
will be to argue that if limited bombing does not 
produce a solution, that further bombing, more extensive 
military action, is the answer. The danger is that the 
decision to resume may become the first in a series of 
steps on a road from which there is no turning back--a 
road which leads to-catastroph24for all mankind. That 
cannot be permitted to happen. 
This argument was a repetition of the escalation argument in the May 6 
speech. But here, Kennedy linked that abstract argument to a specific 
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Johnson policy, contending that that policy could lead to "catastrophe." 
He moved closer to a direct attack. He also maintained the pattern 
of subordinating pragmatic concerns to moral considerations. The policy 
should be rejected because it will not work, but, as the climax construction 
suggested, what was more important was that it would cause catastrophe 
for all mankind. That could not be permitted to happen. 
Another Senator became very angry about the resumption of the 
bombing. The head of the Senate Foreign Relations ColillD.ittee, J. William 
Fulbright, opened public hearings on February 4, 1966. Ostensibly, 
the hearings were to approve some routine funding for the war, but 
they became a public debate over the war. These hearings transfixed 
the nation much as the Senate Watergate hearings were to do seven 
years later. Large parts of the hearings were carried on national 
television, and the committee received over 20,000 letters in the first 
three weeks after the conclusion of the testimony. 25 National hearings 
on network television, with experts such as General James Gavin, 
George Kennan, Wayne Morse, Eugene McCarthy, and Fulbright himself 
challenging Administration policy did much to legitimize the anti-war 
position. No longer were the kids on their own. 26 Most people, however, 
remained as undecided as the New York Times, which on the one hand, 
carried effusive praise of Dean Rusk by Max Frankel, and on the other 
hand, shrewdly noted that the Administration had changed its justifi-
cation for the war. 27 Its position now rested primarily on the SEATO 
treaty and on the American duty to save the South Vietnamese from the 
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Red Menace. As Rusk's testimony indicated, the Administration 
seemed to think that the people of South Vietnam would be happy if they 
were not Communists and very few other factors were considered, 28 
Robert Kennedy watched the hearings with a growing sense of 
frustration. He felt the hearings were too abstract, too academic. 
He wanted to know what concessions the Administration was ready to make 
to bring peace. In short, he wanted to find out what concrete steps 
the United States would take to end the war. Debate about the 
reasons for America's entry into the war or over the military strategy 
practiced in Vietnam would not formulate a peace policy. Since the 
Fulbright hearings failed to come to grips with these specifics, Kennedy 
decided to issue his own statement. 
A remarkable degree of naivete accompanied the release of this 
position paper. Immediately after the press conference on the state-
ment, Kennedy left for a ski vacation in Vermont. He assumed that few 
people would pay attention to a policy paper on Vietnam released on a 
Saturday morning. After all, he did not think he has said very much 
29 that was new, The ensuing furor shocked Kennedy and made this state-
ment an object of controversy. 
RFK began the speech with a long and detailed justification for 
dissent. The opening line alluded to the just completed Fulbright 
h . 1 b 1. h II h h t . d. . 1130 earings, a e ing t em anot er great cap er in a great tra ition. 
Kennedy called the roll of great debates and great orators of congresses 
past to bolster his right to speak and dissent on Vietnam. 31 The 
next portion of the argument detailed the ramifications of not debating 
59 
the issue, Relying primarily on the reasoning of Justice Holmes, 
Kennedy contended that democracy necessarily meant experimentation, 
that the only way to make good and reasoned judgments of the policies 
in a democracy was through the "marketplace of ideas. 1132 He ended 
this section of the introduction with a series of rhetorical questions 
comparing other, obviously minor, issues to "the great issues of 
war and peace. 1133 Clearly, Congressmen had a duty to debate these 
great issues, for if they did not, they betrayed both their heritage 
and their constituency. Finally, Kennedy concluded the introduction 
with an admonition decrying ad hominem attacks: 
To attack the ~otives of those who express concern about 
our present course--to challenge their very right to 
speak freely---is to strike at the foundations of the 
democratic process which our fellow c~zizens, even 
today, are dying in order to protect. 
Kennedy completed this defense of dissent by invoking the words of 
Thomas Jefferson to accompany the mute testimony of American war dead. 
This introduction attempted to justify public policy discussion 
and debate by placing Kennedy's dissent in the great, patriotic 
tradition of American history. In essence, Kennedy was seeking to shift 
the burden of presumption. Most opponents of the dissenters, such as 
Barry Goldwater, cited above, expected the dissenters to prove their 
patriotism since they fought the will of the President in wartime. 
Kennedy, on the other hand, argued that dissent was as American as 
apple pie, Abraham Lincoln, Daniel Webster, and Justice Holmes. Those 
who dissented possessed "courage and conviction."35 Thus, the protesters 
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were only acting as Thomas Jefferson suggested and exercising rights 
provided by the Constitution. By arguing from tradition, Kennedy 
spoke the language of the "Great Silent Majority." He was an American, 
the same as any of them, and he revered the symbols that permeate 
American life. The introduction, however effective, justified only 
the~ of dissent, not the substance of the dissent itself. Even if 
he had earned a hearing and good will, Kennedy still needed to make 
his case. 
He began that process by listing the concerns of the American 
people. Kennedy sought to create his audience by giving them the same 
concerns that he felt. In essence, he asked them to take on certain 
36 characteristics, to play a role. The introduction had begun the 
process by imbuing the audience with the traditional symbols of 
American life. Kennedy placed this audience in the American and Western 
tradition of reason, moderation, and open discussion. They would 
listen to all of the alternatives and make the rational decision. 
( 
Kennedy continued this role by using the word "concern" when listing 
the problems of the Administration's policy. Rational people become 
concerned, not wild or furious, when policy worries them. In a series 
of parallel constructions, Kennedy presented the difficulties that 
troubled these Americans. 37 Moreover, he constantly sought to make 
himself the spokesman of the group. "We are concerned," was the 
constant refrain as Kennedy and the audience shared the discussion, 
bound together by connnon concerns. The speech enacted the same 
qualities assigned to the audience--rationality and moderation. The 
substance of the concerns also reinforced the aura of rationality. 
This audience worried about the death and destruction in South 
Vietnam, they worried about the stability and characteristics of the 
South Vietnamese government, they worried about Communist China, and 
they worried about the effects of the war on domestic programs. 38 
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Unfortunately, this audience felt no guilt. "Concerned" people 
rarely challenge the existing order, unless they have very good reasons 
and strong motivation. Kennedy provided neither. In stark contrast 
to his later speeches, he did not make this audience personally respon-
sible for the death and destruction in Vietnam. He did not admit 
any responsibility on his part. In other words, he specified no cost 
for continuing this war. The only price discussed came in the last 
area, the effects of the war on the domestic programs. RFK spent the 
maJority of this paragraph arguing that the war perpetuated discrimina-
tion because the draft created inequities. He was right, but the 
middle class wanted the disparities to exist, for they kept nice, white 
middle-class kids out of the war. 39 Kennedy's failure to argue that 
the war cost the audience badly damaged his position, for the rest of 
the speech asked the audience to take risks to end the war. His policy, 
"the middle way--the way of negotiations--involves risks," risks that 
potentially could cause failure. Since Kennedy did not reveal the 
price of the current policy, he provided no reason for calm, rational, 
moderate people to plunge into the unknown. 
This problem, in turn, carried implications for Kennedy's efforts 
to generate policy re-examination. His failure to specify the cost of 
the war for the audience left their belief system intact. Without a 
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clear justification for a change in policy, Kennedy made it more 
likely that people would view his motives with suspicion. If he did 
not have a reason to change policy, he had no reason to speak, unless, 
of course, he spoke for personal, political gain. The introduction 
justified Kennedy's right to dissent, but it did not provide the 
substance of the argument. When RFK failed to demonstrate that we 
needed to risk losing in order to achieve peace in Vietnam, he opened 
himself to strong attacks. Why chance a change when no reason exists 
to change? With his motives under suspicion and the audience still com-
placent, Kennedy could not provoke public policy deliberation. 
The rest of the speech attempted to provide an alternative policy, 
but without a good justification for change, the speech labored under 
a heavy burden. After presenting the concerns of the audience, Kennedy 
articulated the "central question . our political strategy in 
Vietnam; not simply how to move, but in which direction we wish to 
40 move." By taking this tack, Kennedy asked the audience to shift 
perspective. The Fulbright hearings failed to address this issue, 
concentrating, when they discussed negotiations, on how to get to the 
table, rather than on what we should do once we started the peace 
process. As Kennedy argued, "Negotiations or discussions are only a 
means by which our ultimate goals may be reached •.•• Without clear 
goals in mind, negotiations are pointless. " 41 
The discussion of American goals began with two familiar Kennedy 
strategies. First, RFK used the words of the Administration to define 
42 the ends sought. Again, this strategy allowed him to find some 
common ground with his opponents and made him appear a reasonable 
man. He also placed himself in the center of the American political 
spectrum, associating himself with those who believed America had 
63 
a noble purpose in Vietnam. Kennedy, then, agreed that the United 
States sought self-determination for South Vietnam and an end to 
Communist aggression. Second, he employed a residue structure to sift 
through the policy options available to the American public. 43 He 
repeated the arguments he made in the May 6th speech, and they provi-
ded him with the same strategic advantages. He grounded the evaluation 
of alternatives in moral values and again came to the conclusion that 
withdrawal and escalation were morally repugnant and practically 
impossible. Thus, he left the audience with the option of a peaceful 
settlement and the feeling, created through the inductive structure, 
that they had participated in the discussion of policy. He led the 
audience to the conclusion that right made might and the policy that 
best exemplified this value should be enacted. 
Unfortunately for Kennedy, this speech did not have as its purpose 
the examination of broad principles of guerrilla war. It sought to 
support a specific negotiating position that differed materially from 
the Johnson position. 44 Even as he conditioned the audience to view 
the war through a moral perspective, he provided no compelling moral 
reason to change policy. Johnson argued that his policy saved the 
South Vietnamese from the evil of Communism and America had a moral 
duty to do this. Kennedy agreed. Yet, as he argued next, he proposed 
to allow the Communists into the government of South Vietnam. Without 
an attack on the morality of the American actions in prosecuting the 
war, Kennedy could provide no compelling reason for an innnediate 
change in policy that carried considerable risks. If no immediate 
policy change was necessary, then the Johnson policy might well 
accomplish the same goals, with a much lower risk factor. Neverthe-
less, Kennedy presented his proposal. 
He kept the rational tone of the speech by defining what he 
thought a negotiated settlement was in principle: "A negotiated 
settlement means that each side must concede on matters that are 
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. . d . . h . 1 n45 important in or er to preserve positions tat are essentia. Just 
before this definition, Kennedy acutely and bluntly presented the 
essential positions of the combatants: 
For the United States it must be that we will not 
turn South Vietnam over to the North. For North 
Vietnam it must be that they will not accept a settle-
ment which leaves in the South a hostile government, 
dedicated to the physical destruction of all Communist 
elements, refusing any economic cooperation with 
the North, dependent upo~6the continued presence of American military power. 
This perspective required that the United States accede to North 
Vietnam's "one irreducible demand." The Communists in South Vietnam 
must be given a "share of power and responsibility" in the governance 
47 of that country. This concession involved risk, of course, for, as 
many people would point out, Communists in the government often 
resulted in a Communist government. The American Cold War tradition 
verified this view, as did the only other limited war, Korea. Kennedy's 
description of the "irreducible demand" coincides exactly with what 
the United States achieved in Korea. RFK defended the risk in three 
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ways. First, America already took this risk "every day in a hundred 
countries in every corner of every continent" that might be an 
b . f C . . 48 o Ject o ommunist aggression. After all, America did not have 
troops everywhere. Moreover, Kennedy reinforced this line of 
reasoning with yet another residue structure, If the United States 
failed to risk, the only other options with these "discontented 
elements in South Vietnam" were to "kill them or repress them" or to 
"turn the country over to them," i.e. military escalation or with-
d 1 . 1 d . d 49 rawa, two options area y reJecte. Unfortunately, the analogy 
did not quite hold, as repression did not necessarily equal escalation, 
as the Korea example proved for many people. Second, America was 
50 founded on "a basic faith in the aspirations of man." When people 
could choose, they chose democracy. Again, the Cold War history demon-
strated that the people often could not choose, as in Hungary. Finally, 
Kennedy provided a number of examples of the success of just such risks 
in American policy and attempted to provide international safeguards 
f h . 1 h ld f h · Sl or is pant at wou ensure ree c oice. The most successful 
example was that of the Cuban Miss:i.Jle Crisis. Kennedy pointed out that 
in "October of 1962" President Kennedy negotiated without surrendering 
America's vital interests and Senator Kennedy implied that his proposal 
would achieve the same success. He concluded by arguing that the risk 
would let Americans "meet our responsibilities to our posterity--to 
walk the final mile toward peace, not so much for ourselves as for 
52 those who will come after." 
Eugene McCarthy expressed the frustration of Kennedy's Senate 
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colleagues when he told the Washington Post that he had made the 
same suggestion "a couple of weeks ago and nobody paid any attention 
t ·t 1153 0 l. • People certainly paid attention to Kennedy. Hubert Humphrey 
attacked from his Pacific tour, variously labeling the proposal, "putting 
a fox in the chicken coop •• a prescription for ills that includes 
a dose of arsenic .... and an arsonist in the fire department." 54 
On the day after the statement, George Ball on "Issues and Answers" 
and McGeorge Bundy on "Meet the Press" attacked the Kennedy proposal. 
Ball argued that Kennedy would force the South Vietnamese to face a 
"coalition government in which obviously the National Liberation Front 
would play the dominant role, and from which any representative from 
55 Saigon would be excluded." Bundy struck a particularly low blow, 
quoting John Kennedy on coalition governments: "I do not believe that 
any democrat can successfully ride that tiger. 1156 Senator Fulbright 
endorsed Kennedy's idea, as did McCarthy. They did not seem to outweigh 
the Administration. 
Press reaction showed some variation, but most of the Fourth 
Estate attacked Senator Kennedy's proposal. The New York Times praised 
the speech, even as James Reston criticized the plan as unworkable and 
C.L. Sulzberger said, "Both Peking and Hanoi must have gained fresh 
encouragement by the joining of our know-nothings with our know it 
11 1157 a s. Kennedy captured the front page of the Times on February 
20, 21, 22, and 23. The Washington Post devoted heavy coverage to 
Kennedy's speech, concluding in an editorial, "Peace and Principle," 
that Hanoi was obstructing peace and Kennedy was wrong. 58 The 
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Washington Star felt that Kennedy's solution was "fantasy." This 
59 editorial reappeared in its entirety in U.S. News and World Report. 
The Christian Science Monitor argued that Hanoi would make Kennedy's 
1 . .bl 60 pan impossi e. In a somewhat more vitriolic vein, the Chicago 
Tribune ran an editorial entitled "Ho Chi Kennedy," and the New York 
Daily News ran a cartoon depicting na scrawny Kennedy holding a giant 
61 hachet emblazoned 'Appease Viet Cong.'" 
The newspapers also discussed the political implications of 
Kennedy's stance. The New York Times ran an article entitled, "Kennedy's 
Vietnam Plea Spurs Popularity on Democratic Left. 1162 The Christian 
Science Monitor left its readers with these words: "It is also reported 
that groups of the Democratic left are turning to Senator Kennedy as 
their 'hero' on Vietnal!l--a result not entirely unfQr_eseen by the 
63 Kennedy camp." The Washington Post noted that this was a "bold, 
public move by the brother of the late President • a significant 
political development •.•• Li!:../ goes considerably beyond the 
Johnson Administration's public position. 1164 The newspapers saw Kennedy 
breaking sharply with the Johnson Administration. 
Given the adverse reaction to the rift, Kennedy took the practical 
political course and began to mend fences. He came back from his 
vacation and went on the "Today" show to defend his positions. Meanwhile, 
his old friend Maxwell Taylor said he believed that Kennedy's policy 
did not seriously diverge from the Administration's. If the South 
Vietnamese wanted to bring the "fox into the chicken coop," that 
would be fine. Johnson sought only to prevent a coalition government 
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before elections. Bill Moyers, Johnson's press secretary, seized upon 
this opening, and Kennedy agreed to the compromise. The rift was 
healed. 65 
The compromise simply gave the press more ammunition. Time and 
Newsweek both discussed the deal. Time rather derisively portrayed 
the incident as Kennedy "in full retreat, 1166 Newsweek concentrated on 
the ac-c-ommodation, but also pointed out Kennedy's new-found popularity 
among the liberals. Newsweek, in a rare instance of media support, 
agreed with Kennedy, arguing that Johnson's veto of a coalition 
government constituted a major precondition to negotiations. 67 U.S. 
News and World Report engaged in the most comprehensive coverage. It 
reprinted Kennedy's entire statement and followed it with the negative 
W h . S d" · 1 68 as 1ngton tare 1tor1a. In that same issue, U.S. News discussed 
the controversy in "The Fight RFK started--should we negotiate with 
69 the Viet Cong?" The article rejected the Moyers compromise, contending 
that very real differences separated Johnson and Kennedy on this issue. 
RFK saw the Viet Cong as an independent entity, thus the war was 
civil, while LBJ saw the Viet Cong as generic Communists, thus the war 
f N h Vi . 70 was one o ort etnamese aggression. The "Washington Whispers" 
column of March 7th followed its usual form, noting that unspecified 
"people" think Kennedy took a bad gamble on Vietnam. He acted as an 
"obstructionist," and nobody liked obstructionists. 71 Finally, in 
one last round of coverage, the magazine interviewed Kennedy, Humphrey, 
and, for a Republican view, Melvin Laird. 72 For Kennedy, the coverage 
was finally over. 
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Robert Kennedy continued to use a number of the same rhetorical 
strategies that had previously appeared in the May 6, 1965 and July 9, 1965 
speeches in this address. He accepted the Administration's definition 
of the war aims, a tactic that sought to create connnonalities between 
himself and Johnson. He used inductive structures to encourage a 
sense of audience participation. In keeping with this strategy, 
Kennedy also remained on a peer level with the audience, displaying 
the same concerns they felt and always showing respect for their 
rationality and intelligence. Kennedy continued to quote considerable 
authority evidence, in particular, continuing the implication that 
John Kennedy would not have approved of the present Administration's 
policies regarding Vietnam. These strategies put Kennedy in a good 
position to provoke public argument, especially when he combined them 
with his increased concern for the beliefs and opinions of the audience. 
He not only made himself a peer of the audience, he clearly identified 
himself with them. He spoke as a "voice from within. 1173 Kennedy 
spoke in a language that made him at home with the audience. They 
recognized his patriotic symbols, and this rhetoric had the potential 
to make RFK welcome in the minds of many Americans. 
Unfortunately, Kennedy did not challenge the beliefs of these 
Americans. They might have welcomed him into their homes, but their 
view of the war did not budge one iota. A stock issues debater could 
have explained the problem to Kennedy. He did not create a need for 
change in the mind of the audience. Since he had spent so much time 
carefully defining the war in moral terms, he needed to present a 
reason for a new policy that rested on American values. This Kennedy 
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failed to do, leaving the symbolic realities of the audience intact. 
When he then asked the audience to risk America's prestige in a 
policy change, there existed little chance for acceptance. Kennedy 
introduced a concept, the inclusion of Connnunists in a government, 
that the Cold War mentality instantly rejected. Since Kennedy failed 
to force the audience to reconsider the views that formed that mentality, 
indeed used patriotic symbols that may well have fed into it, he 
invited the backlash that occurred. The familiar voice from within 
presented a very ugly policy proposal. Kennedy compounded the problem 
by his response to the whirlwind. The media constantly portrayed 
RFK's motives as political in nature. 74 Since he did not provide a 
moral reason for change, such as revealing his own horror at the war, 
he provided no alternative motivation for the audience to consider. 
When.he then agreed with Moyers that he had not challenged Administration 
policy, he further reinforced this perception. Suddenly, he was not 
like the audience at all. He did not speak for America, he spoke for 
his own political gain. When the going got tough, Robert Kennedy 
collapsed. He bargained with Johnson's underlings. Such a perception 
of Kennedy did not encourage people to accept his request for policy 
re-examination. 
Kennedy did not come away from this speech a completely crippled 
political figure. He still maintained an enthusiastic constituency 
that supported the Kennedy name, and, as the articles in the media 
pointed out, the Left became more enamored of Kennedy, even after his 
retreat. This statement, however, damaged Kennedy. He himself admitted 
that he had made "a few mistakes in handling it" and that it was 
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"unpopular politically." He insisted, however, that he 11would do 
it all over again" if necessary. 1175 Before that time arrived, Kennedy 
needed to refine his rhetorical strategy. In a sense, this statement 
is the most poignant of Kennedy's efforts, for he clearly identified 
the major problem. America wanted a negotiated settlement, but it 
did not want to concede the "one irreducible demand" of the other 
side, because, after two centuries of winning, it seemed so much like 
losing. Most opponents of the war, including Robert Kennedy, could 
not find a way to enter this universe of belief and persuade Americans 
to make the concession necessary to end the war. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE TURN TO OPPOSITION 
The furor over the February 19, 1966, statement again quieted 
Kennedy. He had not found a good way to communicate his concern about 
the war to the American public. Moreover, the suspicion was growing 
among Kennedy and his supporters that LBJ would do exactly opposite of 
whatever Kennedy suggested just out of spite. 1 Such a perception did 
not encourage public statements. In April of 1966, Kennedy made his 
last formal statement of the year on Vietnam. 
The impetus for the speech came from a Johnson Administration 
announcement of no sanctuary, If American planes engaged enemy planes 
over North Vietnam, American pilots would be free to pursue the enemy 
wherever they went, including China. 2 Naturally, this policy upset 
Kennedy, for it made more probable his greatest nightmare: Chinese 
intervention sparking World War III. In a short speech on the Senate 
floor, Kennedy expressed his disapproval of such a policy. 3 He also 
noted that the Johnson Administration was once again concentrating on 
military matters, when only the creation of a "viable political structure 
in South Vietnam" would stabilize the situation in Vietnam. 4 Apart from 
stating these two points, Kennedy said very little. As a matter of fact, 
he let two newspaper articles he inserted into the Congressional Record 
provide the bulk of his discourse. 5 In press conferences, on the cam-
paign trail in the fall for other candidates, or abroad, Kennedy refused 
to grapple with the issue and instead took refuge in broad generalities 
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about the complexity of such foreign policy decisions. 6 
Robert Kennedy, however, could never remain inactive and 1966 was 
no exception. While he failed to address the Vietnam question, a 
number of other statements affected his credibility and thus later 
influenced public reception of his speaking. In general, though, this 
period of quiet boosted Kennedy's ratings in the opinion polls. 7 The 
explanation for this phenomenon is that Kennedy's popularity tended to 
wax and wane with Johnson's ratings. The more unpopular Johnson became, 
the more popular Kennedy, as the natural alternative to Johnson, became. 
RFK's own actions, however, also affected the polls. 
In June, for instance, Kennedy conducted perhaps the most success-
ful of his foreign trips, a journey to South Africa. 9 He stepped into a 
tense situation. His invitation had come from one of the major protest 
groups in South Africa and his reputation as a strong liberal critic of 
apartheid proceeded him. If he condemned the South African government 
too strongly, he ran the risk of becoming an outsider agitator and 
verifying to American observers his irresponsibility. On the other hand, 
if he failed to attack apartheid, the political consequences in the 
United States would be catastrophic, and he would greatly disappoint the 
people who had invited him. 1° Kennedy responded by focusing on the value 
of an individual. This strategy of presenting the individual's responsi-
bilities, duties, and rights also permeated Kennedy's Vietnam rhetoric and 
these South African speeches clearly revealed the political philosophy that 
guided Robert Kennedy. RFK made the welfare of the individual the measure 
of the society. He emphasized the universality of the "community of man 
[sic]." With words that echoed his brother's famous Berlin speech, RFK 
78 
argued that the fate of any one person affected all people. Finally, he 
explicitly contended that the most pragmatic policy was idealism: 
It is not realistic or hard-headed to solve problems and 
take action unguided by ultimate moral aims and values. 
It is thoughtless folly. For it ignores the realities 
of human faith and passion and belief; forces ultimately 
more powerful than all the calculations of economists or 
generals .••• It is this new idealism which is also, 
I believe the common heritage of a generation which has 
learned that while efficiency can lead to the camps at 
Auschwitz, only the idffls of humanity and love can climb 
the hill to Acropolis. 
This statement was Kennedy's most eloquent argument for idealism. 
The rhetoric in South Africa forecast the major themes of the Vietnam 
discourse. Idealistic policy guided by moral values was the most prac-
tical policy. The individuals in society cannot relinquish responsibility 
to a nameless, faceless state. The success of the South African trip 
could only have reinforced in Kennedy's mind the efficacy of such 
strategies. Unfortunately for Kennedy, the rest of the year would see 
few such triumphs. 
His troubles began in the summer of 1966. Attorney General Katzenbach 
informed Kennedy that the Justice Department planned to file a brief with 
the Supreme Court, confessing that the FBI had engaged in illegal wire-
tapping in 1963. 12 Kennedy faced a no-win situation. Either he knew 
about the wiretaps, and acted illegally, or he did not know, and had 
acted incompetently. Kennedy preferred charges of lax administration to 
illegal activity and insisted he knew nothing about the taps. The attacks 
on this issue swirled about him for the rest of his life. As two of his 
strongest assets were his honesty and his integrity, the controversy 
hurt. 13 
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The wiretapping affair bit a peak in December of 1966 with calls for 
. l . . . 14 a congressiona investigation. This was unfortunate timing, for Kennedy 
also found himself embroiled in a messy controversy over William Manchester's 
book, The Death of a President, In 1964, in order to preempt other accounts, 
Robert and Jacqueline Kennedy commissioned Manchester to write a book about 
the death of John Kennedy. "On March 28, 1964, Manchester signed a 
contract providing that 'the final text shall not be published unless and 
15 until approved' by Jacqueline and Robert Kennedy." Manchester finished 
in late 1966, and the Kennedys objected to the text. Jacqueline Kennedy 
felt that Manchester used material from oral history interviews that was 
too personal. Manchester agreed in some instances, and excised certain 
b h d h . . 1 · . 1 16 passages, ut e argue t e main motive was po itica. Schlesinger agreed, 
but maintained that the original text portrayed Johnson as an essentially 
17 evil person, the personification of the Dallas that killed John Kennedy. 
This could hardly improve the already strained relations between Robert 
Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. Again, Robert Kennedy found himself between 
a rock and a hard place. If he had let the book appear with the blessing 
provided by the contract, it would seem as if he had commissioned a 
character assassination of LBJ. On the other hand, when he decided to try 
t'o change the book, he revived all of the old charges of ruthlessness, at 
the same time the wiretapping controversy also emphasized those qualities. 
Events of the winter of 1966 caused a precipitous drop in Kennedy's fortunes. 
He could hardly find solace in the progress of the war in Vietnam. 
Some five thousand Americans died in ~ietnam in 1966. 18 The Joint Chiefs 
of Staff thought that the 543,000 troops they wanted to have in Vietnam 
by the end of 1967 would turn the trick and Johnson himself went to Vietnam 
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and urged American troops "to nail the coonskin to the wall. 1119 The 
United States vigorously bombed North Vietnam throughout this period, 
with the approval of 67 percent of its citizens. Only 24 percent thought 
20 that the bombing should stop. In November of 1966, 51 percent of 
Americans said that the United States had not made a mistake by entering 
21 the war. In September of 1966, 55 percent of the country felt that 
the Administration should increase the commitment to Vietnam. 22 
Despite the polls, division continued to grow. The protest movement 
became more active and, in late 1966, the North Vietnamese allowed the 
first American reporter into the country since the start of the conflict. 
Writing from the North, Harrison Salisbury reported that the bombing 
raids were not the surgical strikes that the Johnson Administration 
claimed. He disclosed that cities and towns had come under attack, with 
. d bl . · 1 · 1 . 23 consi era e civi ian casua ties. Further, a report commissioned by 
24 the government maintained that the bombing campaign was doomed to failure. 
In words that echoed Kennedy's speech of January 31, 1966, the report 
argued that the rural economy of North Vietnam could not be bombed into 
submission. A CIA summary sent to Johnson at about the same time also 
. d h ff . f h · 25 questione tee ectiveness o t e air war. Finally, more and more of 
America's allies doubted the Administration's course and voiced their 
opinions, as Robert Kennedy discovered in early 1967. 
In February of that year, Kennedy set off for Europe. Journalists 
likened the trip to that of a President. U.S. News and World Report 
called the tour "unprecedented" and Newsweek stated that it had "all of 
the earmarks of a Presidential procession. 1127 In France, Kennedy met with 
Etienne Manac'h, the director of Far Eastern Affairs at the Quaid' Orsay. 
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Kennedy took John Gunther Dean, the Vietnam expert at the .American embassy, 
along with him. During the conversation, Dean picked out a "peace feeler." 
Manac'h seemed to be saying that the North Vietnamese had told him that 
they would drop all preconditions for negotiations; they only wanted a bombing 
halt. This was a new position on opening the talks and constituted a 
breakthrough. Dean drafted a cable about the "feeler" and sent it to the 
28 State Department. Combined with later statements from Premier Kosygin 
of the Soviet Union, it looked as if the negotiations might have a chance 
b . 29 to egin. 
Meanwhile Robert Kennedy had no idea that he had heard a peace feeler. 
The situation worsened when someone leaked the cable to Newsweek and 
the magazine reported that Kennedy had participated in this diplomatic 
30 flurry. Johnson was already enraged that Kennedy had met with European 
heads of state. Now it seemed as if the Senator wanted to conduct his own 
negotiations. When Kennedy returned, he sought a meeting with Johnson to 
explain that he did not know what had happened. At the meeting on February 6, 
tempers exploded. According to various accounts Johnson told Kennedy that 
America would win the war in the next six months and that all the doves 
would be politically dead. Johnson also questioned Kennedy's patriotism. 
Kennedy nearly stormed out. While he did not treat the press to something 
31 quite that exciting, the damage was done. Time reported (and later 
retracted) that Kennedy called the President an "S.O.B. 1132 Kennedy appeared 
to be interfering with foreign policy, and his image suffered accordingly. 33 
He came away from that meeting sure that Johnson sought military victory 
and determined to challenge such a policy. He ordered his aides to prepare 
82 
a major address on the war. 
Johnson also realized the open break had arrived, and began to plan 
a series of responses to the upcoming speech. He knew Kennedy would propose 
a bombing halt to take advantage of the peace feelers. Kennedy also 
presented a three-step plan to bring peace, but the bombing halt was the 
clearest and easiest distinction between the two positions. Before Kennedy 
opened his mouth, William Westmoreland, the connnander in Vietnam, denounced 
34 a bombing pause. Averell Harriman asked Kennedy '" in the national 
interest' not to encourage Hanoi and undermine the harassed President."35 
On the day of the speech, March 2, Johnson made 
••.• two unscheduled speeches in Washington, held an 
unscheduled news conference to announce that Russian Premier 
Kosygin had agreed to talk on reducing the stockpile of 
nuclear weapons, announced that he was inviting all of the 
Nation's governors to the White House, had Senator Henry 
Jackson read on the floor of the Senate a predated letter from 
him, explaining why the bombing was necessary, and confirmed 
the rumor that his daughter Lucy was pregnant.36 
Johnson still could not deny Kennedy the headlines. 
Robert Kennedy's speech began by emphasizing the remoteness and 
complexity of the war: "Mr. President, 10,000 miles from this chamber we 
are engaged in a violent conflict that has engulfed the land of Vietnam."37 
The war presented "tangled and resistant complexities. 1138 Kennedy, then, 
opened by discussing the reasons for the complacency of the audience. The 
battles raged outside of the experience of most Americans. There existed 
few reasons for them to feel responsible for American actions in prosecuting 
the war, nor did the price of the conflict seem to outweigh the cost in 
prestige of compromise. People simply followed the President, and Kennedy 
39 acknowledged the "grave and painful responsibility" borne by Johnson. 
Kennedy still refused to condemn the President publicly. RFK's intro-
duction established the problems of the war and the difficulty in 
finding any sort of a solution. Such a mainstream position partially 
relieved Johnson of responsibility for failing to find peace and it 
placed Kennedy in the middle of the political spectrum. 
Kennedy continued the process of affirming his credentials as a 
moderate by again accepting the Administration's goals in Vietnam. 40 He 
understood Johnson's problems, he recognized the complexity of the war, 
and he refused to join the young radicals in demanding immediate with-
drawal. Kennedy remained a reasonable man seeking a reasonable solution 
to the Vietnam war. In other words, he was a traditional Democrat. He 
parted from the conventions, however, when he admitted his culpability 
for the current policy: 
Three Presidents have taken action in Vietnam. As one who 
was involved in many of those decisions, I can testify that 
if fault is to be found or responsibility assesse~1 there 
is enough to go around for all--including myself. 
This key passage accomplished several strategic goals. First, he 
met the issue of his "dramatic conversion" directly. Rather than finding 
some excuse for his change of heart, he simply admitted error and asked 
to be held responsible for that error. Second, that admission mirrored 
the change taking place throughout the country. Kennedy's conversion made 
it easier for others to do the same thing; as long as no authority figure 
had taken such a step, few others were likely to take such a risk. 
RFK created a bond between himself and those who also were once true 
believers and who now felt doubt. Third, the strategy minimized the 
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personal conflict with Johnson. Kennedy not only praised the President, 
the Senator accepted at least some of the fire for a controversial 
policy. Finally, such an admission allowed Kennedy to place responsi-
bility on every American for Vietnam. Without his own admission, Kennedy 
would have practiced the same confrontational style of many other war 
protesters. He would have attacked the American society as if he were 
morally superior. setting himself in direct opposition to much of the 
d . 42 au ience. Such a situation would not have provoked soul searching, for 
Kennedy would have been an alien, just as the student radicals were, and 
the audience would not have responded. Instead, Kennedy spoke as the 
voice from within, sharing the pain with the audience, and sharing in 
the search for a reasonable solution. This admission of responsibility 
and acceptance of fault was the keystone of Kennedy's strategy on March 2nd. 
Since he had dismissed blame as an issue, Kennedy proceeded to define 
the real problem for the audience. As he had done many times before, 
he presented a moral perspective on the war. The pragmatic goals of the 
country could best be achieved while seeking the "most compassionate cause 
43 of humanity--the common cause of peaceo" Using an eloquent parallel 
structure based on the phrase, "still there is no peace," Kennedy expressed 
the frustration of the audience with a Vietnam policy that expended 
enormous resources with few results. 44 For the first time in his Vietnam 
discourse, Kennedy pinpointed and detailed the futility of Johnson's 
policies. RFK emphasized the disparity of the combatants and the nature 
of the war: 
We have sent more than 400,000 men into battle. Fleets 
of extraordinarily complex planes pour their devastation 
upon the paths and villages which divide an ancient 
jungle. The most powerful country the world has ever 
known now turns its strength and will upon a small and 
primitive land.45 
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By the end of this section, Kennedy had praised and noted the extravagant 
efforts of politicians, diplomats, and soldiers to end the war. Yet 
that one damning phrase revealed that all of these efforts had come to 
naught. Implicitly, Kennedy argued that no effort, perhaps short of 
nuclear attacks, could succeed, for if these tremendous exertions had 
failed, what remained? Finally, Kennedy created identification while 
causing discomfort. All felt the frustration, and could unite with 
Kennedy on that point. At the same time, Kennedy's depiction of the 
war caused unease. America, "the most powerful country the world has 
known," was "pouring devastation" on a "small and primitive land." 
Somehow, that did not seem American or right. The policy of peace instead 
brought death. 
Kennedy, however, did not leave the blame primarily on America's 
doorstep. He claimed "the fault rests largely with our adversaries" for 
h . . 46 t e continuing war. Again, Kennedy placed himself in the middle of the 
political spectrum, agreeing with the conventional view of Communism as 
evil and of Communists as warmongers. This position, of course, repre-
sented the primary threat to Kennedy's arguments. If the Cormnunists were 
at fault, then there was nothing the United States could do, and no 
d f 1 ·1 .bl 47 one nee ee gui ty or responsi e. The audience could then reject 
any effort at genuine argument about the war. Their present set of beliefs 
provided a logical answer for the continuing conflict. 
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Robert Kennedy recognized the merits of this position: "If our 
·11 . 1148 enemy wi not accept peace, it cannot come. Kennedy, however, 
began the process of provoking the audience to rethink its positions by 
invoking a legal and religious standard known to most Americans: 
Yet we must also look to ourselves. We must have no doubt 
that it is not our acts or failures which bar the way; 
that there is nothing we have left undone which we might have 
done. Our own course must be subject to ceaseless and cri-
tical examination, not with the certainty that people can 
take comfort and strength from the knowledge that America 
has taken every step, done every action, and performed 
every deed within its power to put an end to this distant 
and ferocious war,49 
This is an extraordinary paragraph which uses three rhetorical strategies 
aimed at allowing Kennedy to confront the audience while creating unity. 
First, Kennedy imposed the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard found 
in American courtrooms as a criterion for American policy in Vietnam. 
The clear presumption of such a standard, combined with the second strategy, 
the familiar echo of John Kennedy's Inaugural, made this a powerful 
argument. Finally, the first three lines of the argument echo the prayer 
of confession known to many religious groups in America. People routinely 
ask forgiveness not only for the evil they have done, but also for what 
they have failed to do. In this paragraph, then, Kennedy demanded that 
the audience invoke their own religious, legal, and political values to 
conduct a searching examination of American policy in Vietnam. RFK's words 
had the power to disrupt the belief system of the audience, clearly 
implying that all had sinned in the past, while creating unity by 
including himself in those sins and through his participation in their 
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value structure. Policy questions, however, almost always contained doubt. 
Why should these rigid standards be applied to American policy in Vietnam? 
Kennedy hinted at the answer when he indicated that "our own people 
can take comfort and strength" from these standards. Kennedy demanded 
these criteria because he felt that all Americans were responsible for 
the horror in Vietnam, including himself, and he planned to assign them 
that burden. The only way most people could conscionably prosecute the 
war with such a perspective was by adhering to the standards. If 
Kennedy's proposal provided even the faintest glimmer of peace, the 
American people must accept it, for, if they did not, they would be 
guilty of causing the carnage in Vietnam. Kennedy confronted the American 
people with their responsibility for the deaths caused by the war to try 
to force them to change policy. Essentially, he asked them to put them-
selves and him on trial for murder before themselves and God. Only if 
America had done everything possible to bring about peace were its citi-
zens innocent of sanctioning mass slaughter. By forcing the audience to 
confront its moral responsibility for this carnage, he provoked a public 
re-examination of policy in Vietnam. 
He continued the process by repeating that the war may not have been 
"our doing. 115° Kennedy reiterated the theme of the introduction, noting 
the remoteness of the war and the difficulty of feeling "in our hearts 
what this war means to the people of Vietnam. 1151 It must seem like the 
Apocalypse, Kennedy said, again invoking religious values by quoting the 
prophecy of John in Revelations 6:7. He asked the audience to dwell "on 
the horror" of the war. 52 For the first time, perhaps, the audience 
came face to face with the human consequences of the war. Kennedy 
described in detail ''the vacant moment of amazed fear as a mother and 
child watch death fall from the improbable machines sent by a country 
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53 they barely comprehend." In stark contrast to the official language 
on the war, Kennedy used terms that put the audience in the shoes of the 
mother and her child. It was not napalm, it was "death by fire." It 
was not a plane, it was an "improbable machine." It was not a bombing 
t . . d h 54 sor ie, it was eat. RFK made the audience feel the terror of a civil 
official facing death at the hands of a Viet Cong assassin and, finally, 
he spoke of "the young men, Vietnamese and American, who in an instant 
sense the night of death destroying yesterday's promise of family and 
land and home. 1155 
He described in concrete detail the horror in Vietnam; he did not 
allow his audience to evade the devastation of the war. Kennedy comple-
ted his argument for a rigid standard by assigning responsibility: 
All we say and all we do must be informed by our aware-
ness that this horror is partly our responsibility; not 
just a nation's responsibility but yours and mine, It is 
we who live in abundance and send our young men out to die. 
It is our chemicals that scorch the children and our bombs 
that level the villages. We are all participants. To know 
this, and to feel the burden of this responsibility is not 
to ignore important interests, nor to forget that freedom 
and security must, at times, be paid for in blood. Still 
even though we know, as a nation, what it is necessary to 
do, we mu~t a;go feel, as men, the anguish of what it is 
we are doing. 
Senator Kennedy accomplished several important objectives in this 
statement. He made the deaths of that mother and child the individual 
responsibility of every single American, including himself. Only the 
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earlier admission of his own responsibility allowed him to adopt such 
a risky strategy. The audience, potentially, would not react negatively 
because Kennedy shared the burden with them. Both he and the audience 
had always realized the national interest and neither had ever denigrated 
its importance. Now he and the audience realized the pain of the war 
and the daunting burden of waging it. All of these deaths were on their 
heads if they missed an opportunity for peace. Thus, "our apprehension 
of this war's agony now joins with other mounting urgencies to command 
us to seek every opportunity, open every door. and tread every path 
which may lead to the end of the war. 1157 Again, the familiar phraseology 
of the Kennedy Inaugural reinforced the standards Robert Kennedy demanded. 
RFK used the values of the audience to force them to confront the 
human devastation of the war and to place themselves on trial for those 
deaths. Such an experience shattered complacency and created the condi-
tions for genuine argument. 
Kennedy also tied the war to other, more pragmatic concerns of the 
audience. The destruction made the reconstruction of South Vietnam 
more difficult and expensive. The war increased tensions among the super-
powers and causes disagreements between American and its allies. The 
conflict consumed resources needed to alleviate poverty at home. 58 
All of these costs, moral and pragmatic, were in "pursuit of what 
Secretary McNamara has called limited objectives--not conquest or alliance, 
but the protection of South Vietnam from domination by force, 1159 Kennedy 
pointed out that the government had always said this obJective could 
best be achieved through negotiations. Kennedy again used the strategy 
of quoting the Administration and aligning his interests with their goals. 
This passage, however, also pointed out the disparity between those 
goals and the methods being used in Vietnam. Limited goals logically 
required limited means. Kennedy suggested that the time had come to 
turn to more modest methods, for America was "balanced between" hints 
f d d . fl. 60 o peace an sprea ing con ict. Obviously, the moral, and now, 
90 
logical, forces in the situation rejected spreading the war. Before 
presenting his policy alternative, Kennedy dealt with one last objection. 
He realized that many would claim that a negotiating initiative 
damaged the war effort and demonstrated weakness to the enemy and the 
world. Kennedy developed two responses. First, a peace initiative 
would not change the military picture. "If our effort fails," he said, 
"then the conflict will continue."61 He also argued that, if the dis-
cussions were a failure, then we could "reexamine our entire military 
strategy • in light of the changing nature of the war. 1162 America 
had nothing to lose militarily. Second, he dealt with the prestige 
question. Turning the objection on its head, Kennedy maintained that 
it was our great prestige that allowed us to take initiatives: "No one 
is going to defeat us, or slaughter our troops, or destroy our prestige, 
63 because we dare take initiatives for peace." Using support from the 
Bible: "Where no counsel is the people fall; but in the multitude of 
counselors, there is safety," Kennedy contended that advice, negotiating 
64 initiatives, and help should be welcomed from all quarters. 
Senator Kennedy may have opened people's minds to the possibility 
of change, but he still had to persuade them to accept his proposals. 
He spent the remainder of the speech defending the practicality of his 
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ideas. Such a defense was not hard to make, for Kennedy had constructed 
easy criteria. If the plan offered the slightest chance for success, 
then the conscience of the audience would demand assent, for otherwise, 
the audience, not the Communists, would be to blame for the carnage of 
the war. 
, 
Kennedy presented his alternative in three sequential steps: 1) Halt 
the bombing to take advantage of recent hints that a halt would bring 
negotiations. 2) Continue the negotiations without increased fighting. 
3) Seek a final settlement giving the people of South Vietnam self-
determination. The chronological actions gave the plan an aura of 
. 1 . I d h f 1 · 1 d · 65 practica ity. t seeme, on t e sur ace, ogica an attractive. 
Kennedy knew from Johnson's preliminary salvos that the bombing 
halt wou]d be the most controversial proposal. He developed a significant 
and effective defense to possible attacks along three lines. First, he 
argued for the credibility of the recent hints about negotiations. The 
feelers came from Kosygin, Soviet President Podgorny, and from the Foreign 
Minister of North Vietnam. Certainly, these men should have authority. 
Kennedy admitted the hints had often been obscure, but he used an 
excellent analogy to bolster the need to take advantage of them. President 
Kennedy had received just such contradictory signals from Kruschev during 
the Cuban Missile Crisis. John Kennedy boldly seized upon the more 
conciliatory signal, and this decision resulted in success. Robert 
Kennedy proposed that the United States do the same thing in March of 1967. 66 
This analogy not only supported Kennedy's claim, it reminded the audience 
of his participation in a foreign policy success. Second, Kennedy pointed 
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that America halted the bombing a year before without any evidence that 
the action would bring negotiations. ''Why then do we not try again in 
67 this far more hopeful moment?" Finally, Kennedy indicted the effective-
ness of the bombing as a means to accomplish American objectives in 
Vietnam by using a familiar strategy: reluctant testimony. Carefully 
quoting the reasons President Johnson had provided for the bombing at 
Johns Hopkins in 1965, Kennedy concluded that the presence of 400,000 
fighting men accomplished the function of increasing the confidence of 
- 68 the South Vietnamese. The troops also achieved the objective of 
. . h C . f . v· 69 convincing t e ommunists o our commitment to ietnam. Kennedy noted 
that the third purpose of the bombing was, to "slow down aggression." 
He quoted General Ridgeway, "the commander of our last ground war in 
Asia," General James Gavin, and Secretary of Defense McNamara, all of 
whom concluded that the bombing did not slow the infiltration rates. 70 
Kennedy ended this section by refuting the punishment argument. Many 
felt. that America ought to punish aggression. Kennedy asked whether 
we had the moral right "to play the role of an avenging angel pouring 
death and destruction on the roads and factories and homes of a guilty 
1 d n71 an • 
RFK based the workability of the next two steps of his plan on inter-
national supervision. The United Nations would step in and ensure the 
f . h . ld 1 h ·1 · · · d 72 ig ting wou not esca ate w 1 e negotiations continue. They would 
also be the agency that could conduct free and fair elections, insuring 
the participation of all elements in South Vietnam. 73 Kennedy, in 
keeping with the tone of this part of the address, offered these proposals 
as "suggestions to be refined and revised by the critical examination of 
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other minds."74 However speculative the proposals were, Kennedy provided 
enough backing in terms of analogies and authority evidence to pass his 
75 test. These suggestions offered enough of a practical possibility 
for success to demand assent. 
Kennedy concluded the speech by returning to the stakes involved 
in the quest for peace. These stakes were the key, for they provided 
the reason for the acceptance of speculative plan. If Americans did not 
want to be blamed for the death of "a young American even now preparing 
for the day's battle," then they had better adopt Robert Kennedy's 
solution. As he summarized: 
There is great principle and there is also human anguish. 
If we can protect the one and prevent the other, then 
there is no effort too great for us to make.76 
Admittedly, the country failed to unite behind Kennedy's proposals. 
Lyndon Johnson launched a counteroffensive, beginning with the letter to 
77 Henry Jackson. Senator Jackson read the letter on the floor of the 
Senate, and it functioned as a rebuttal to Kennedy's position. It also 
hinted that Kennedy risked doing the boys overseas a disservice. The 
Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, argued that "proposals 'substantially 
similar' to those put forth by the New York Democrat in a Senate speech 
today had been explored 'without result. 11178 The Administration rejected 
Kennedy's ideas, continued the escalation in Vietnam, and mobilized the 
considerable firepower at its disposal to attack the Senator. 79 
Other political figures around the nation lined up as expected. Given 
the ratio of hawks to doves, that did not help Kennedy very much. Senators 
Fulbright, Clark, Tydings, Pell, Gore, and Cooper, the only Republican, 
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supported RFK. 80 Senator Charles Percy, another Republican, termed 
Kennedy's proposals useful, but said that the politics of the Democratic 
81 Party damaged the peace process. The Majority Leader of the Senate, 
82 Mike Mansfield, sought the middle ground between Kennedy and Johnson. 
Most other political figures, including major Republicans such as 
Dirksen and Nixon, attacked Kennedy. 83 
Naturally, the speech attracted heavy media coverage. The press 
concentrated on the political consequences. Kennedy's proposals were 
seen as the means he planned to use to wrest the White House away from 
Johnson. As such, he was playing politics with an important issue, 
Newsweek, for instance, wrote: 
The implied and always anonymous charge that Kennedy had 
thus sabotaged the peace process seemed debatable at 
best--but it was equally doubtful that the declaration 
of open warfare between the President and the Senator 
had advanced their common objective: to bring the war 
to an end. 84 
Time and U.S. News and World Report also talked primarily of politics, 
while devoting considerable space to critics of the speech. Time, in 
85 particular, sought to refute Kennedy's arguments. U.S. News used its 
''Washington Whispers" column to undermine Kennedy's authority: 
Senator Robert Kennedy (Dem.) of New York is regarded by 
most of the Democratic leaders as a disruptive influence 
inside the party because of the Senator's repeated oppo-
sition to President Johnson on foreign and domestic poli-
cies, and particularly on the Vietnam War.86 
"Washington Whispers" of February 27, the week before the speech, gave 
Johnson space to worry publicly that Kennedy might become another "Harold 
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87 Stassen." The Wall Street Journal attacked the speech on policy 
grounds, while the New York Times accepted the substance of the address. 88 
Neither James Reston, nor C.L. Sulzberger, however, were enamored of 
Kennedy's ideas. 89 The Christian Science Monitor articulated the anti-
Kennedy viewpoint most clearly: 
Whereas the Kennedy speech seems unlikely to affect 
American policy on Vietnam, it can have a greater effect at 
home. For when Senator Robert F. Kennedy breaks with 
President Johnson, the country knows there is more in 
the offing than merely the conduct of the war. 
There is, first, Senator Kennedy's unceasing and 
purposeful determination to seize upon every issue 
which he believes can bring him closer to the White 
House. There is, second, the never-healed animosity 
of the Kennedy group for the man who succeeded John 
Kennedy in the Presidency. There is, third, the contin-
uing effort of the Senator's campaign managers to invest 
everything he says with double importance regardless 
of the subject or whether others have said it earlier. 
Thus, among the certain effects of the Kennedy 
speech will be to heighten domestic tension over the 
war and to deepen political cleavages as the 1968 Presi-
dential campaign approaches,90 
The American public gave some assent to this anti-Kennedy viewpoint. 
The Senator's other problems combined with the speech to drive his 
91 poll rating down, and he fell behind Johnson 45-41 percent in March. 
Gallup also discovered that of the 47 percent who knew the difference 
between the Johnson and Kennedy positions on the war, 59 percent preferred 
92 Johnson and only 30 percent chose Kennedy. Even that, however, was an 
inprovement over the figures on the question of a bombing halt asked before 
93 the speech. By May, LBJ ran ahead of Kennedy 49 percent to 37 percent 
94 among the general population and 52 percent to 39 percent among Democrats. 
Kennedy's legions did not rally around the standard. 
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One explanation for media focus on the political ramifications is 
provided by Todd Gitlin. In his 1980 book, The Whole World is Watching, 
Gitlin argues that the media 1Il the United States use "frames" to 
organize their coverage: 
Media frames are persistent patterns of cognition, interpre-
tation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and 
exclusion, by which the symbol-handlers routinely organize 
discourse, whether visual or nonvisuai.95 
For Gitlin, and for Kennedy in 1968, the key questions involve the frame 
around the event. What frame is it? Why one and not another? Gitlin 
provides at least one criterion for the selection of a frame: "Keep 
in mind that the traditional narrative structure of a news story selects 
for dramatic (preferably melodramatic) conflict • Political 
96 polarization made good copy." While Gitlin' s analysis applies speci-
fically to the SDS, the theory fits the coverage of Kennedy's discourse. 
The dramatic handle, the "peg," was the conflict between the two titans 
of the Democratic Party. Add in the bonus that the one was the brother 
of the dead President the other replaced and the fact of personal animosity 
between them, and the story was irresistible. The newspeople grabbed 
the conflict, while the editorial pages piously worried about the effect 
the conflict would have on the prospects for peace. Kennedy's substantive 
proposals failed to match the excitement of a battle between the crown 
prince and the President. 
For Kennedy, such coverage yielded unfortunate results, for it 
emphasized his own worst qualities. He became the ruthless politician 
who, even in wartime, sought to undermine the President and grab power 
for himself. Even when people doubted the President, they were likely 
to support him when he came under direct attack as he tried to lead 
the country through a crisis. Further, Kennedy's refusal to openly 
grapple the President damaged him. It appeared as if Kennedy harbored 
Presidential ambitions, judging from the press, while hiding them, 
judging from the speeches. The combination made Kennedy seem like a 
cynical politician, not a leader in a moral crusade to end the war. 
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The refusal to attack Johnson also failed to allow Kennedy's 
rhetorical form to complete itself. Kennedy sought to use confrontative 
strategies to provoke genuine argument and change policy. Recall that 
Scott and Smith write: "Justifying a sense of rightness and, perhaps, 
firing a sense of guilt in the other is the hopeful outcome of the 
many coy confrontations of some shy radicals. 1197 Robert Kennedy used 
"coy" confrontation to fire that sense of guilt in the audience and, as 
Natanson demands, to "existentially disrupt" the "affective world" of the 
98 audience. Kennedy did not wish to destroy the present order. Instead, 
he sought to shock the audience out of its complacency, to put the audience 
in a frame of mind to accept his policy proposal. The assignment of 
personal responsibility for scorching young children and killing American 
soldiers certainly had the potential to challenge the "inunediate life of 
feeling and sensibility" of the audience. 99 Kennedy, however, despite 
his acceptance of blame, refused to accept his own challenge to "seek 
every opportunity, open every door, and tread every path" for peace. In 
theory, Kennedy could persuade Johnson to change policy if the country 
would tum against the policy. By not attacking Johnson, Kennedy held 
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his political options open. He did not have to run to fulfill that 
responsibility. In fact, everyone knew Johnson would not accept 
Kennedy's proposals. It was becoming increasingly clear that the 
only way Kennedy could implement his ideas was to challenge Johnson 
openly. This he refused to do. Either he was willing to accept all 
of this carnage on his conscience or he did not really believe what he 
was saying. Kennedy's rhetorical strategies painted the picture of an 
apocalyptic world where all needed to take a stand against evil. Yet, 
at this time, he refused to attack Johnson and clung to the notion 
that he could influence Administration policy from the Senate. If Kennedy 
continued this line of argument in the future, it would eventually 
compel him to challenge Johnson to retain any hope of changing policy. 
If he refused, he would consistently face the signs that had started to 
appear when he spoke on college campuses: "Hawk, Dove, or Chicken?" 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
A MORAL CRISIS 
The March 2nd speech marked a turning point for Robert Kennedy. 
Despite any criticism, he would continue to speak out on Vietnam. 
Newfield argues that the speech "emancipated Kennedy psychologically 
and intellectually about Vietnam. 111 This emotional catharsis cost 
Kennedy political prestige. He fell behind the President in public 
opinion polls, and his continued refusal to attack Johnson openly hurt 
his standing among his natural constituency, the anti-war young. 2 That 
refusal became more and more difficult as summer turned to fall and 
the talk turned to presidential politics. The Democratic left sought 
a challenger to Lyndon Johnson, and the pressure on Robert Kennedy 
began to mount. 
Unfortunately for Lyndon Johnson, he could take joy only in his 
margin over Robert Kennedy that gloomy summer. The public's approval of 
his handling of Vietnam dropped steadily throughout this period. Fur-
ther, Johnson faced yet more critical decisions about the war. In the 
spring of 1967, General Westmoreland came back from Vietnam with another 
troop request. While optimistic in public, in private he warned the 
President that, at present levels, this war of attrition could continue 
indefinitely. If, however, Johnson could see his way clear to send 
another one hundred thousand troops, the war could end in three years. 
"Add yet another one hundred thousand: he could shrink the schedule to 
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3 two years." Johnson, with visions of Korea dancing in his head, 
plaintively asked about the enemy's combat strength. Couldn't they 
just keep adding troops? 4 Westmoreland reluctantly conceded it "likely." 
Couldn't they call for "volunteers" from China? Westmoreland thought 
that "a good question. 115 Johnson gave the general forty-five thousand 
troops and told him to do the best he could. 
Westmoreland did not go away satisfied and neither did the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. Moreover, they thought they might have a solution. 
Spurred on by Johnson's timidity and by a McNamara plan to limit the 
war effort until after the election concluded, the generals went to 
an ally in the Senate. John Stennis of Mississippi was as unhappy with 
the war as any dove. He, however, embraced a different philosophy, 
pungently summarized by a popular bumper sticker of the day: ''Win or 
Get Out," Stennis frankly preferred to wID, and when the generals 
came to him with their troubles, he was more than happy to oblige, 
He scheduled a series of closed hearings to investigate "the alleged 
attempts by 'unskilled civilian amateurs' to shackle the 'professional 
military expe.t::ts.. '" For Johnson, satisfying this powerful Southern 
conservative was a priority, On August 9th, the day before the hearings 
opened, Johnson eased restrictions on bombing targets and permitted 
the Air Force to attack targets within Hanoi and Haiphong. 7 
The doves in the Senate decided they needed to remind Johnson of 
their political presence, The increased bombing and the rumors of 
fraud in the South Vietnamese elections gave them the opportunity to 
make their point. It was becoming clear that the candidate certification 
process in South Vietnam efficiently weeded out all opposition to 
the Ky-Thieu regime. 8 The two Senators from New York, Kennedy and 
Republican Jacob Javits, rose on August 11th to launch a wide-ranging 
attack on Administration Vietnam policy. 
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Javits opened the barrage by taking the unprecedented step of proposing 
a Vietnam budget cut. He attacked the conduct of the war and the 
elections, and he vowed to fight appropriations for the war. Javits~ 
speech sparked a rare extemporaneous exchange of views. That debate 
revealed an increase in opposition to the war. Previous supporters of 
the Administration, such as Pastore of Rhode Island and Symington of 
Missouri, questioned the American position in Vietnam. 9 
Robert Kennedy, first in prepared remarks, then in the debate, 
continued his opposition to Lyndon Johnson's policy. His prepared 
statements followed the same rhetorical strategies marked out in 
earlier addresses. He argued that the primary effort in Vietnam 
should be political and pointed out the failure of the South Vietna-
mese to take such political steps. The absence of fair elections, 
Kennedy maintained, could only undermine "the moral basis of our connnit-
ment in Vietnam. "lO 
Kennedy began the speech by making yet another effort to place 
himself in the middle of the political spectrum: 
I do not question the need for the United States to 
remain militarily strong; nor the wisdom of protecting 
other nations from aggression; nor the urgency of pro-
viding swiftly and fully the resources required by 
the men we have sent into battle. These remain items 
of high priority on our national agenda.11 
Kennedy clearly separated himself from the more radical position of 
Javits. He did not directly confront the issue of appropriations, 
hoping to sidestep such controversy. His determination to provide 
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the necessary "resources" placed him in agreement with majority opinion. 
Kennedy continued to portray himself as a moderate in order to reach 
"Middle America." 
Kennedy's entire statement of opposition carried a moderate tone. 
He quoted and agreed with Lyndon Johnson's war aim: "We fight for the 
principle of self-determination that the people of Vietnam should be 
able to choose their own course. 1112 Kennedy then proceeded to demon-
strate the increasing divergence from this goal by both the Americans 
and the South Vietnamese. He thus returned to the rhetorical tactics 
of 1965. RFK defined the war effort as one which should be primarily 
political and then documented departures from this ideal. The South 
Vietnamese government barred opposition candidates. It held political 
prisoners. It was controlled by the military. 13 Kennedy also noted 
that this government could not even do a good job of prosecuting the 
war, and he again provided a great deal of substantiation. American 
casualties were higher than South Vietnamese casualties. The South Viet-
namese draft age was a year higher than the corresponding American age. 
The rural pacification effort was failing. 14 In general, the South 
Vietnamese had not made much of an effort to win the war, either 
politically or militarily. 
Kennedy finished the speech by adding the fraudulent elections to 
the calculus. At this point, RFK began very tentatively to attack the 
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moral basis for the American effort. If the South Vietnamese did not 
allow free elections, then "we would not be honoring our commitment 
/!:_o self-determinatioii/-- we would be betraying it. 1115 For the first 
time, however carefully, Robert Kennedy publicly questioned the moral 
justification for the war. Prior to this speech, he had always agreed 
with the rationale for the war itself, but questioned U.S. tactics on 
moral grounds that because the war killed many people there was a moral 
imperative to take every opportunity to negotiate. These unfair 
elections, however, violated the basic premise of the America connnitment. 
If the United States supported a government not of the people's choosing, 
it would have no moral position in that part of the world and no justi-
fication for the carnage of the war. Not merely the tactics, but the 
American effort itself was wrong. 
Kennedy's prepared remarks did not come close to making such a 
controversial position explicit. He merely asserted that a represen-
tative government would be better able to carry on the political effort 
needed to negotiate an end to the war. The basis for a moral condemna-
tion of the war existed, however, and Kennedy has a much more difficult 
time sounding moderate in the debate that followed his speech. After 
several Senators rose in support of his position, and indeed, went 
farther than RFK in attacking the war, Kennedy again voiced his mis-
givings.16 He noted that the allies in Vietnam had decided to divide 
the responsibilities, with the Americans fighting the major military 
engagements in order to allow the South Vietnamese to engage in pacifi-
cation. The Americans, along with parts of the South Vietnamese 
army, achieved some military success, but the pacification efforts h,ad 
failed. That, as Kennedy argued once again, was the key to the war. 
He quoted John Kennedy on ~he need for a primarily South Vietnamese 
effort and maintained that a fraudulent election signaled the failure 
of the political push. Now the war had become an American war. The 
massive United States commitment, combined with the shortcomings of 
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the South Vietnamese government, had changed the war. It had become 
"our war against the Asians, and thus a continuation of the struggle of 
the French against the people of South Vietnam. 1117 The analogy clearly 
argued that Americans possessed no moral right to fight in Vietnam. 
Kennedy did not let the argument rest there. After listening 
to Frank Church oppose the war, RFK again spoke on the i11DDorality of 
the American effort. This time, he completely abandoned the carefully 
modulated phrases of his prepared remarks. Kennedy began the attack 
by contending that the United States sought self-determination for 
South Vietnam. The present election completely violated the stated 
American purpose, and Kennedy listed the violations of fairness present 
in the election. He then explicitly stated the position he had so care-
fully implied earlier: 
Where is our moral position in that part of the world? 
Without a free election, I do not believe it is there 
any longer .•.• If the Saigon regime is not going to 
cooperate so that the people can decide what they want, 
what is our position in Vietnam? I think it will be 
destroyed.18 
Predictably, the media reaction to the speech focused on Kennedy's 
strongest remarks. Fortunately for RFK, however, most reporters chose 
to discuss his criticisms in the context of the other speeches. The 
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New York Times began its article by noting that a "dozen Senators from 
both parties" attacked the elections. 18 Kennedy's name was not even 
mentioned on page one, and the Times chose to reprint his prepared, 
moderate remarks, while quoting his stronger attacks late in the news 
story. The Times lumped Kennedy and Javits together and listed a number 
of Senators who supported them, including previous backers of the Admin-
istration.20 The Washington Post also framed the story in terms of a 
Senatorial revolt, as did the Christian Science Monitor and Newsweek. 21 
While the Monitor downplayed-Kennedy's role, both Newsweek and the Post 
identified him as a leader of the revolt and reported that he "went 
further than he ever has before in publicly questioning the underlying 
basis for the American presence in Vietnam, 1122 In general, press coverage 
of the speech put Kennedy in a favorable light. He had led a large 
group of Senators in condemning the war. Thus, his position did not 
connote personal ambition. Many other Senators agreed with him, indeed, 
felt more strongly than he did about the innnorality of the conflict. While 
Kennedy's other Vietnam speeches had sparked Senate debate, coverage of 
those speeches had centered around Kennedy's statements and their poli-
tical consequences. This time coverage made him part of a large group 
and explicated the substantive opposition to Administration policy. 
Moreover, Kennedy also possessed the advantage of being able to argue 
about an easily understood, concrete transgression against American 
values. Everyone understood the idea of a free election, and the 
exclusion of certain candidates clearly violated American ideals. For 
once, the doves saw a fat pitch to hit, and they drove it a mile. Kennedy 
could articulate strong, moral opposition to the war in a very advantageous 
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setting with lots of support. He could not help but benefit. 
Public opinion polls reflected RFK's advantages. In September and 
October, he underwent a political resurgence. He pulled ahead of LBJ, 
leading by a wide margin in November. 23 The polls also showed increasing 
disenchantment with the war. In the November report, for the first time, 
a plurality of Americans felt that the United States had made a mistake 
by entering the war. 24 Further, by a wide margin of 70 percent to 21 
percent, Americans felt that the Administration was not telling them 
25 all that they needed to know about the war. American confidence in 
LBJ's leadership was not very high. Naturally, Robert Kennedy, as the 
strongest alternative to the President, began to feel very strong pressure 
to run for the nation's highest office. RFK, however, thought that the 
effort would be a futile one. The political logic of the situation 
demanded Johnson's renomination. Kennedy's moral arguments on the war, 
however, flouted such political logic. The moral imperative to "take 
every step" to end the war did not allow for political prognostication. 
Nowhere was Kennedy's ambivalence and agony over this decision more 
clearly displayed than on "Face the Nation," November 26, 1967. 26 
The interview began with Kennedy denying any interest in the Vice-
Presidency. Then, Martin Agronsky wasted no time cutting to the heart 
of the matter. Noting Kennedy's criticisms of the war, Agronsky wondered 
why Kennedy failed to place the national interest over party loyalty 
and run for the Presidency. Kennedy responded with a remarkably cogent 
description of his rhetorical problem. He argued that the press never 
treated his criticisms of the war as substantive attacks on Johnson's 
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policy. Instead, the media portrayed the discussion as a personality 
struggle between himself and the President. That perspective on his 
proposals for change weakened the dialogue taking place in the country. 
If, Kennedy argued, he was to run for the Presidency, the dialogue 
would be about personalities, not issues. Kennedy refused to let that 
27 happen. 
RFK used the next question as a springboard for more discussion 
of the need for communication and discussion on the issues facing the 
28 country. He accomplished two goals with this answer. First, he 
separated himself from the radicals by condemning the violence and the 
lawlessness in the streets. Later in the program, he also attacked the 
hecklers who prevented people from speaking, even if they disagreed with 
the views of those people. As he had done in the beginning of the Febru-
ary 1966 statement, Kennedy placed himself on the side of reason. 29 Commu-
nication and dialogue "could be healthy for the country" and Kennedy 
30 wanted to create such an atmosphere. Second, Kennedy endorsed the idea 
of McCarthy's candidacy without endorsing McCarthy. The candidacy 
would spark a debate in the country and that was RFK's goal. Focusing 
on the need for dialogue allowed him to avoid an endorsement, while 
arguing that the discussion occasioned by the McCarthy campaign obviated 
the need for a Kennedy candidacy. 
Kennedy had found a refuge from political pressures. Unfortunately 
for him, that argument clashed with the main themes of his rhetoric, and 
the questioners continued to press Kennedy. Clearly, the focus on 
dialogue was inconsistent with Kennedy's demand for risk. Since the 
March 2nd speech, RFK had consistently asked that the American people 
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take responsibility for the war. Kennedy's retreat into platitudes 
about the need for communication allowed him to escape such responsi-
bility and implicitly let everyone else off the hook. If all one needed 
to do to clear one's conscience was to talk about the war, everyone should 
have a clear conscience by 1967. Oblivious to such contradictions, 
Kennedy continued to argue that the ~ar was each individual American's 
responsibility. The inconsistency badly damaged any effort to achieve 
genuine argument, because Kennedy failed to display the very qualities 
of courage and risk that he so eloquently demanded of others. 
The correspondents, particularly Agronsky, continued to ask Kennedy 
to clarify those positions. Agronsky put the matter bluntly: 
Well, Senator, leaving hypocrisy aside, this business of 
dealing yourself out of the campaign until after the nom-
ination might seem excessively timid, even self-serving for 
your own political future. Don't you feel that the issue 
of Vietnam is so important that you should participate 
in the debate?31 
Agronsky's question, of course, left Kennedy a way out and he immediately 
insisted that he had participated in the debate. Evidently feel:in.g that 
Kennedy would continue to stonewall, the correspondents shifted their line 
of ques~ioning. They asked Kennedy if Johnson could negotiate a settle-
ment, or if a new President was needed. Kennedy thought LBJ could, although 
32 he disagreed with the way Johnson sought peace. Wicker then noted that 
McCarthy could provide an alternative method and, if McCarthy did so, would 
Kennedy not come under more pressure to run as the candidate who offered 
both a choice and a chance? Kennedy responded with public agony. He 
repeated his pledge not to run and sadly noted, "No matter what I do, I 
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am in difficulty. 1133 He said he just could not see what he could do 
34 "other than to get off the earth in some way-." Agronsky indirectly 
apologized to Kennedy, and quickly shifted to the substance of the 
Vietnam problem. RFK allowed the frustration he obviously felt about the 
campaign to pour out when he discussed Vietnam. He condemned the war in 
very strong terms. 
First, in a response to a question about the war, Kennedy attacked the 
claims of impending success advanced by General Westmoreland. Kennedy 
noted that Westmoreland made his prediction contingent upon two conditions. 
First, that the United States continue the bombing and that the North 
Vietnamese not escalate. 35 Second, that the South Vietnamese do more. 
Kennedy refuted the idea that either condition would ever come to pass. 
He pointed out that while the North Vietnamese "don't bomb Detroit," they 
receive more sophisticated weapons from the Russians, they send in more 
troops, and the end result is the same. M A . d. 36 ore mericans ie. The whole 
history of the Vietnam conflict, Kennedy argued, revealed this kind of 
response when the Americans escalated. Only the foolish could think 
that the Communists would stand quietly by while the Americans increased 
their effort. 37 Second, Kennedy noted that the South Vietnamese were 
doing less, not more, and he attacked the efforts of the Saigon government. 
He agreed that the South Vietnamese should do more, but contended that 
38 they had shown no inclination to do so. Again, Kennedy buttressed his 
arguments with specific examples and with references to American values 
and American self-interest. He noted that the government of South Vietnam 
39 had failed to institute land reform or to hold free elections. These 
transgressions led to an ineffective war effort, causing Americans to 
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take over the bulk of fighting, resulting in the loss of yet more 
American lives. The failure to enact moral values led directly to 
the loss of lives. Moral values must form the basis for successful 
policy. Kennedy, however, continued to follow this line of argument 
by questioning the moral justification for the war itself, and not just 
the tactics used to prosecute it. 
Tom Wicker began a question by noting that the Administration had 
recently put strong emphasis on "a great threat from Asian Communism" 
as a justification for the war, and he wanted to know what Kennedy thought 
of that. 4° Kennedy launched into a comprehensive attack on the rationale 
for the war. He separated Johnson's war from John Kennedy's war, and 
he condelillled the morality of Johnson's version. For the first time, 
Kennedy associated Lyndon Johnson with the immora:lity of the war. 
RFK began by accepting his share of the blame for the war. Clearly, 
however, the mistakes he and his brother made differed markedly from 
the errors of Lyndon Johnson, and this difference rose from the change 
in goals. Kennedy asserted: 
First, we were making the effort there so that the 
people would have their own right to decide their 
future •. That is certainly the way I looked 
at it when I was in President Kennedy's Administration 
and when I was with President Johnson. Now we tumed • 
now we are saying we are going to fight there so we 
don't have to fight on the West Coast of the United 
States, so that they won't move across the Rockies. 
But do we--our whole moral position, it seems to me, 
changes tremendously."41 
He argued that the war deaths were justifiable only so long as the 
people of South Vietnam wanted to make such sacrifices. Under this 
Administration, however, only the United States demonstrated a 
willingness to fight and made the decision to do so. The people of 
South Vietnam did not seem to want to wage the war. As a result, he 
said: 
We're going in there and we're killing South Vietnamese, 
we're killing women, we're killing innocent people 
because we don't want the war fought on American soil, 
or because they're 12,000 miles away and they might get 
to be 11,000 miles away •.•. Those of us who stay 
here in the United States, we must feel it when we use 
napalm, when a village is destroyed and civilians 
are killed. This is also our responsibility. This 
is a moral obligation and a moral responsibility for 
us here in the United States."42 
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Agronsky encouraged Kennedy to continue: "You feel that our moral 
position, then, is not really defensible, that it can't be?"43 Kennedy 
maintained that it "has been badly undermined and I think that should 
trouble us." 44 RFK provided specific details of incidents that should 
trouble the American people, and he also extended his analysis to the 
effects of this moral catastrophe on the country. In an argument that 
forecast his later campaign speaking, Kennedy contended that the moral 
collapse of the United States in Vietnam damaged the country at home: 
If this country is going to mean anything--when we 
say we love our country but we love our country for 
what it can be and for the justice it stands for and 
what we are going to mean to the next generation. It 
is not just the land, it is not just the mountains, it 
is for what this country stands for. And that is what 
I think is being seriously undermined in Vietnam and 
the effect of it has to be felt by our people.45 
Media reaction to the speech focused on Kennedy's charge that 
Johnson's war differed markedly from John Kennedy's war. Using quotations 
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from John Kennedy, the press condemned RFK as a demagogue. The New 
York Times, for instance, ran a reasonably straight account of the 
interview on "Face the Nation" in its Monday edition. 46 On Tuesday 
the 28th, however, in an editorial entitled "Kennedy vs. Kennedy," the 
Times attacked RFK's use of JFK. 47 The Post also reported the inter-
view, but did not make any editorial comment. On the next page, however, 
they presented a Harris poll that gave RFK a twenty point lead over 
LBJ and included the surprising information that fifty percent of the 
American public wanted a bombing halt. 48 The strongest attack on Robert 
Kennedy's performance came from Emmet John Hughes in Newsweek. 49 In "The 
Time of the Jabberwock" he noted that Kennedy's boyish style on television 
covered up appalling ethical and factual lapses. 50 Hughes minced no 
words. Robert Kennedy misused his brother's name and unfairly attacked LBJ. 
In addition to angering the press, th~s interview significantly 
altered the direction of Robert Kennedy's speaking on Vietnam. Prior 
to the interview, Kennedy attempted to provoke thoughful deliberation 
by affirming the values he shared with the audience and the Administration 
while attacking the way the war was being prosecuted. Specifically, 
Kennedy avoided open conflict with Johnson, and he avoided condemning 
the iJIIIllorality of the war itself. He maintained that U.S. tactics 
caused death and destruction, but he agreed that the essential purpose 
of the war deserved moral approbation. On August 11, 1967, he began 
to depart from that philosophy, but he still refused openly to attack 
and condemn the Johnson Administration. With this interview, Lyndon 
Johnson became part and parcel of the immorality of the war. Robert 
Kennedy admitted his own mistakes and asked that Americans be troubled 
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by those mistakes and by American tactics in Vietnam. He noted, however, 
that "perhaps if you admit mistakes you perhaps are a little wiser 
h h . . h 1151 tan you were wen you were committing t em. While not using the 
specific quotation in this interview, Kennedy had begun to use the 
words of Antigone: "All men make mistakes, but a good man yields when 
he knows his course is wrong, and repairs the evil. The only sin is 
pride. 1152 Clearly, Lyndon Johnson was committing the sin, while Robert 
Kennedy was not. Kennedy still wanted genuine argument. However, he 
shifted to a more confrontative stance and, in doing so, probably lost 
part of his audience, as indicated by negative press reaction. Kennedy 
wanted to hammer home the point that gross immoralities were being 
committed in the name of the American people, and he sought to force 
Americans to come to terms with that fact. If they did that, they 
would reject the war itself as a tenable policy. In order to accomplish 
this task, Kennedy had to "bring the war home" to the American people. 
He needed to specify the cost of the war, especially in light of its 
futility, in even more detail. The rest of his rhetoric revealed an 
increasing obsession with the use of analogies and supporting materials 
designed to make the faraway conflict as real as possible. Kennedy 
wanted to make the American people believe that Lyndon Johnson was 
making them kill and maim thousands for no good reason. That, of course, 
meant that Americans were guilty of murder. The Tet offensive gave 
opponents of the war an opportunity to make this point quite forcefully. 
On January 31, 1968, the American view of the war suddenly changed. 
As Epstein notes, until Tet, the American people saw very little actual 
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53 combat footage on the evening news. The difficulties of taking 
television cameras to war, compounded by the military's unwillingness 
to have the American public see more than the military wanted it to 
see, prevented much initiative by television crews. The Tet offensive 
changed all that. The war appeared outside news photographers' hotel 
windows. To see a battle, all reporters had to do was to walk over to 
the American embassy. The war erupted in living color across the 
television sets of middle America. 
What they saw shook the confidence of the American people in 
their cause and in their leadership. The scenes of the war were devasta-
ting, especially the photographs and film of the execution of a Viet 
Cong prisoner by the head of the South Vietnamese national police, 
General Nguyen Ngoc Loan. Loan simply walked up to a Viet Cong prisoner, 
placed a revolver to the side of the man's head, and blew his brains 
out. The pictures appeared in newspapers and NBC showed a slightly 
d . d • h . 54 e ite version on t e evening news. Clearly, the actions of a top 
ranking South Vietnamese official did not conform to the rules of the 
Geneva Convention Americans had heard so much about and that America 
and its allies always obeyed. Right in their living rooms, Americans 
saw the people who were supposed to be deserving of our help murder a 
helpless prisoner of war. Americans also saw a great deal of combat 
55 footage that indubitably proved the vitality of the Viet Cong. Any 
enemy that could penetrate and attack the American embassy possessed a 
lot of vigor. This impression formed the basis for the second reason 
for the profound distress of Americans about this offensive, It was 
completely unexpected. For several months, the Johnson Administration 
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had assured the American people that the "light at the end of the 
tunnel" had appeared. By January of 1968, this public relations 
campaign resulted in a bare majority of the public, fifty percent, 
believing that the United States was making progress in Vietnam. 56 
Public approval of Johnson's handling of the war actually began to 
creep upward before the offensive. 57 Finally, the Gallup report of 
February, taken before the offensive, showed Lyndon Johnson pulling 
58 ahead of Robert Kennedy 48 percent to 38 percent. After all of this 
optimism, the Tet offensive came as a shock. The Administration made 
a massive effort to prove the battles were a U.S. victory. The official 
line was that the offensive was a great failure, a situation analogous 
to Hitler's desperate last gamble in the Ardennes. Opponents of the 
war immediately responded. Art Buchwald wrote a column portr~ying a 
confident General Custer claiming that the "battle of the Little Big 
Horn had just turned the corner" and the Sioux were "on the run. 1159 The 
Wall Street Journal, of all sources, warned that "the American people 
should be getting ready to accept, if they haven't already, the prospect 
60 that the whole Vietnam effort may be doomed." Robert Kennedy refuted 
the Administration's claims in a speech on February 8, 1968, in Chicago, 
Illinois, the site of the 1968 Democratic National Convention and the 
home of one of America's most powerful politicians, Richard M. Daley. 
Kennedy gave the speech under difficult circumstances. A few 
days before, on the day before the offensive began, RFK announced that 
he would not seek the Presidency under any "foreseeable circumstances."61 
The rational voices of the old politics, Edward Kennedy and Theodore 
Sorensen among others, told him that it simply could not be done, that 
Johnson, as a sitting President, could not be denied renomination, 
and that RFK would destroy his political future in any attempt to 
d h P "d 62 ump t e resi ent. The Tet offensive, of course, changed every-
thing. Kennedy used the forum of a Book and Author luncheon in 
Chicago to release his frustration and attack the Administration's 
claims. 
Adam Walinsky, Kennedy's speech writer, later said that RFK 
took the toughest passages the speechwriters had to offer and added 
some of his own. 63 The speech reflected that attitude. It was 
the most organized of Kennedy's addresses, carefully dealing with the 
five major illusions Kennedy claimed characterized American~policy. 
The speech employed refutation as its major strategy, clearly 
assuming that the Tet offensive had badly shaken the American people. 
If Johnson's arguments could be refuted, the speech seemed to assume, 
then it was likely that the American people would adopt Kennedy's 
policy. For the f~rst time, Robert Kennedy felt that the presumption 
was on his side. Kennedy used four major strategies to refute 
Administration positions. First, he employed the strongest language 
he had ever used. The highly evaluative and emotional labeling 
was clearly designed to draw a strong response from the audience, 
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"to existentially disrupt" their world. This strategy often involved 
the use of bitter and sarcastic humor, aimed at demonstrating the 
absurdity of Administration claims. Second, Kennedy provided a large 
amount of evidence to make this distant, complex conflict real to 
Americans. Analogies were particularly prominent, as Kennedy compared 
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experiences the audience would understand and know to Vietnam. Third, 
Kennedy structured the refutation as a pseudo-debate, quite often 
using phrases such as "It is said" or "We are told," and then rebutting 
the claims set forth. In this way, Kennedy could refute the Administra-
tion directly and enact the role of a superior strategist and 
Finally, in the conclusion, Kennedy directly asked the audience to 
assume the characteristics of courage and bravery that would guarantee 
their participation in genuine argument. He invited his audience to be-
come Americans who would unhesitatingly brave the pain of examining, 
then discarding, false assumptions. This strategy also indirectly 
refuted the often-held belief that opponents of the war were physical 
cowards. Kennedy, a strong authority figure, assured the audience that 
it took more courage to change than to blindly follow a misguided policy. 
All of these strategies aimed at provoking a policy debate. Clearly, 
the speech'assumed that the Tet offensive had successfully disrupted the 
world of the audience. Now Kennedy sought to dispel any arguments that 
might allow Americans to slip back into the old routine of allowing the 
government a free hand and to assure the public that the discontent was 
good and should be channeled toward a change in policy. Kennedy employed 
rhetorical strategies to persuade the audience to "show as much willingness 
to risk some of our prestige for peace as to risk the lives of young men 
in war. 1164 
The beginning set the tone for the speech and introduced the theme 
of illusion versus reality. Using the strategy of labeling, Kennedy 
argued that Johnson dealt with illusions and that the country needed to 
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face reality. The opening quotation from Lord Halifax, the British 
Foreign Secretary who helped negotiate the Munich agreements with 
Hitler, emphasized the magnitude of LBJ's delusions. 65 Using allitera-
tion, Kennedy argued that the enemy, "savagely striking at will across 
all of South Vietnam, has finally shattered the mask of official illu-
sion with which we have concealed our true circumstance, even from 
66 ourselves." Notice that while the illusions possessed "official san-
ction,,, all participated in them. Later, Kennedy included himself 
among those who had predicted victory. RFK continued to make everyone 
responsible for American policy in Vietnam. Not willing to let the 
audience conjure up the illusions, Kennedy carefully quoted a sampling. 67 
The direct quotations devastatingly documented the scope of American 
68 blundering. RFK flatly stated that those "dreams are gone." Acknow-
ledging that the Viet Cong had sustained reversals, Kennedy neverthe~ess 
maintained that the attacks themselves demonstrated the vitality of the 
enemy and belied the "serene" reports of the Administration. Kennedy 
then asked the audience to "face the facts" about Vietnam and to take 
another look at the war, if only for "the sake of the young Americans 
who are fighting today."69 Here, Kennedy directly appealed to the 
large number of Americans shaken by the Tet offensive. Reevaluation 
of the war would help, not hurt, the soldiers in Vietnam. Such an 
assessment obviously needed to occur. 
The body of the speech, then, refuted each of the "illusions" of 
the Administration. The opening refutation will serve as a pattern for 
the rest, for all followed the same form. The first section directly 
attacked the Administration's claims of victory. Kennedy placed all 
of the opposition arguments and his own responses into the form of 
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a debate, refuting Johnson Administration claims primarily through the 
use of analogies and language that often became bitterly sarcastic. 
Taking a page from Art Buchwald's book, Kennedy compared the Tet 
offensive to another great disaster of .American history: "It is as 
if James Madison were able to claim a great victory because the British 
only burned Washington instead of annexing it to the British Empire. 1170 
Kennedy demonstrated the absurdities of the Administration's quantifica-
tions of victory by adding up all of their claims, noting that the total 
exceeded the official estimate of Viet Cong and asking "Who, then, is 
doing the fighting?" 71 Finally, Kennedy argued that the lack of a 
popular uprising in support of the Viet Cong hardly constituted a 
victory: "How ironic it is that we should claim a victory because a 
people whom we have given sixteen thousand lives, billions of dollars 
1m d d d f d d · d · , . "72 and a ost a eca e to e en, i not rise up in arms against us. 
The offensive proved, Kennedy claimed, that the people of South Vietnam 
would not defend themselves even to the extent of telling the Americans 
about the massive infiltration of Viet Cong before the attacks. Fur-
ther, the attacks also demonstrated that no area of South Vietnam was 
safe from conflict. Kennedy concluded this section by absolving the 
American soldiers of any blame and by offering an explanation for the 
defeat: 
This has not happened because our men are not brave or 
effective because they are. It is because we have mis-
conceived the nature of the war: it is because we have 
sought to resolve by military might a conflict whose 
issue depends upon the will and conviction of the South 
Vietnamese people. It is like sending a lion out to halt 
an epidemic of jungle rot.73 
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The strategies revealed in this section of the speech appeared 
again and again throughout the address. Kennedy continued his use of 
strong, evaluative language, emphasizing, for instance, the disparity 
between the ''huge resources" and the "most modern weapons" of the Allleri-
74 cans versus the small size of the enemy force. Extensive use of 
supporting material, from quotations of Administration sources through 
the examination of statistics and including the creation of effective 
and unusual metaphors and analogies, refuted the Administration's 
claims. Kennedy needed this evidence, for he claimed to be representing 
the light of reason. If he was to succeed in his goal, he needed to 
show that his view of the world best fit reality, and the clearest way 
I 
to accomplish that objective was through the use of evidence. The evidence 
gave Kennedy's speech compelling logical power, as when he demonstrated 
the fallacious nature of the Administration's statistics. 75 The 
analogies and the metaphors placed the war in an entirely new perspective 
for the American people and may well have made it more real. The comparison 
between the burning of Washington and the Tet offensive was only one 
example. The jungle rot analogy vividly illustrated the misguided nature 
of the American effort, while still patriotically praising the troops. 
Later in the speech, to make the casualty figures more concrete, Kennedy 
asked the audience to 
Imagine the impact in our own country if an equivalent 
number--over 25 million Americans--were wandering homeless 
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or interned in refugee camps, and millions more refugees were 
being created as New York and Chicago, Washington and 
Boston, were being destroyed by a war raging in their 
streets. Whatever the outcome of these battles, it is the 
people we seek to defend who are the greatest losers.76 
Using these same tactics, Kennedy refuted, in turn, the idea that the 
United States could succeed with the current South Vietnamese government; 
the claim that pursuing military victory is in the interest of the 
South Vietnamese people; the argument that South Vietnam is crucial to 
our national interest; and, finally, the idea that the United States could 
possibly achieve peace without conceding something. All of these claims 
were simply illusions, dreams to be discarded in the cold light of 
reality. Kennedy concluded the speech by sunnnarizing his arguments and 
by redefining bravery in light of the conclusions drawn in the speech. 
This redefinition of bravery became a key to the speech, for 
Kennedy attributed his kind of courage to the audience. Once his listeners 
possessed that quality, they would be more likely to engage in the 
genuine argument that would lead to changing convictions. Kennedy began 
the concluding paragraph with his view of bravery. He argued that the 
Vietnam War required more courage from the government and from the 
American people than any war in history. Immediately, however, he defined 
the kind of courage needed. All wars demand bravery under fire. This 
war, however, demanded that the country have the moral courage to discard 
the illusions that had comforted them for so long. In other words, 
Kennedy demanded that the audience have the courage to risk their beliefs 
and values. The country needed the courage to engage in genuine argu-
ment. Kennedy then assured Americans that they did indeed possess such 
fortitude. The leadership of the nation, he concluded, had to realize 
the need for honest examination: 
Any who seek to comfort rather than speak plainly, reassure 
rather than instruct, promise satisfaction rather than 
reveal frustrat1on--they deny that courage and drain that 
strength. For today, as it was in the beginning, it is 
the truth that sets us free.77 
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The last sentence reinforced Kennedy's position with that most funda-
mental of authorities, the Bible. This speech denied any effort by 
Kennedy to abandon America's values or to leave a loyal ally. Instead, 
Robert Kennedy argued that he wanted to reestablish the most fundamental 
values of the country, and he asked the audience to risk current beliefs 
in order to find those values. If his auditors wanted to seek truth, 
to possess courage, to find peace, and to stop killing, they should 
discard the illusion of Lyndon Johnson's position and adopt Robert Kennedy's 
perspective on the war. 
The speech proposed two contrasting visions of America. Lyndon 
Johnson represented a weak, complacent country, possessed of the "courage" 
to kill thousands, while lacking the moral and intellectual courage to 
see the result of such a policy. Robert Kennedy's America knew the 
agony of the war and thus could find the courage necessary to seek peace. 
Kennedy made the choice easy. He attributed all of the good qualities 
of the country, the qualities that myth had given his brother's Administration, 
to his policy choice. Moreover, he organized these two views of America 
around the criterion of illusion versus reality, truth versus falsity. 
Given the fact that 70 percent of the country felt that the Johnson 
Administration had failed to tell them all that they needed to know about 
the war, and given RFK's reputation for honesty, even brutal honesty, 
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Kennedy chose his strategies well. 78 Add to that the shock of the Tet 
offensive, and it is clear that Kennedy possessed considerable rhetori-
cal advantage_. His use of evidence, his strategy of refutation, and 
his language combined to make the Administration seem out of touch 
with the reality of the war. Finally, and most important, Kennedy did 
not use this speech to attack and condemn those who had followed Johnson 
to thi~ point. The system and the American people were not evil. Any-
one could fall into the comfort of illusion, as Kennedy himself had 
done. The only real sin was failing to take action once one saw the 
dreams for what they were. Kennedy saw the illusions and detailed them 
for the audience. He confronted them, while cherishing the traditions 
of the country. Thus, the audience could choose to follow Kennedy, for 
he was one of them. He respected their values, wanted their help, and 
promised to restore plain talk and truth to the American political 
system. By respecting the audience, while insisting on pointing out 
their illusions and shocking their sensibilities, Kennedy made genuine 
argument possible. 
The media reaction to the speech made two major points. First, 
most of the newspeople noted the exhaustive nature of Kennedy's critique 
and used a great deal of space recounting his arguments. The New York 
Times, for instance, in an article by Tom Wicker, claimed that "the 
brother of John F. Kennedy delivered the most sweeping and detailed 
indictment of the war and of the Administration's policy yet heard from 
any leading figure in either party. 1179 Newsweek labelled the speech 
a "broadside," while the Washington Post emphasized Kennedy's view of 
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Administration policy as illusion, and his claim that the war could 
not be won. 80 Time and the Christian Science Monitor both attacked 
the speech, Time by completely ignoring it, and the Monitor by presenting 
81 its own "dialogue" between Kennedy and Johnson. The Monitor attack 
was rather effective, using Kennedy's own strategy against him, but it 
lost some credibility when the editors tried to present it as a straight 
news story. In genera~, a very large part of Kennedy's attack reached 
the public. 
The second part of the coverage, of course, noted that this speech 
came about as close to a campaign speech as one could get. Tom 
Wicker's view is a representative sample. After indicating that the 
Senator's aides claimed that Kennedy was not a candidate, indeed, that 
he was trying to take his name off the ballot in several states, Wicker 
wrote: 
The first reaction today among members of Congress and others 
here /Washington/ was that so strong an attack was neverthe-
less bound to have political significance. This was parti-
cularly so since the speech followed a spectacular Viet 
Cong offensive against South Vietnamese cities that has 
deeply disturbed many who have supported, as well as those 
who have doubted, the Administration's war policy.82 
Kennedy's refusal to go where the rhetoric clearly took him still plagued 
his efforts to create policy discussion rather than political examina-
tion. Newsweek sunnned up the situation quite well: 
Kennedy's rhetoric was apocalyptic--an emotional assault 
on the immorality of the war in Vietnam and the neglect of 
domestic problems--but his response was politics as usua1.83 
For Robert Kennedy, such a response could not last much longer. 
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His concern about running had always been pragmatic. It just did not 
seem possible to win, and he knew a run against Johnson would be 
covered as a personality struggle, thus damaging his chances and making 
him appear an overeager spoiler. The Tet offensive changed everything. 
Seemingly overnight, the cotmtry rejected Johnson's policies. One 
clear indication of that change appeared in a Gallup poll question that 
asked people to choose one of the two emotion-laden labels, hawk or 
dove. Before the Tet offensive, 24 percent of the country identified 
themselves as doves, while 60 percent chose to be hawks. 84 After the 
attacks, 42 percent saw themselves as doves, while 41 percent picked 
85 hawks. Such a change was made even more remarkable by the results of 
the New Hampshire primary, which proved that people would be willing 
to vote their convictions. Kennedy decided to run. 
Before his announcement, Kennedy made one last speech on the Senate 
floor concerning the war. It occurred during a long emotional debate 
that began with a Fulbright speech deploring any further escalation in 
Vietnam. Richard L. Strout remarked that it was "a debate rarely 
h d . d . f . 1 . . "86 mate e in mo ern times or emotiona intensity. Strout also felt 
that the "most passionate denunciation of the war came from Senator 
87 Kennedy." In this speech, Kennedy released nearly all inhibit ions 
and launched an emotional barrage on the war. The speech, clearly a 
campaign effort and not a policy address, concentrated on the use of 
analogy, metaphor, and emotional language to disrupt the world of the 
audience. It offers an interesting insight into how Kennedy translated 
his policy arguments into campaign speaking, and it was a natural 
extension of the strategies he had been following since 1964. 
Kennedy opened with the observation that the war had divided the 
country greatly. Such opposition demanded that the President justify 
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to the Senate and to the American people any further escalation in the 
American effort. 88 Kennedy then proceeded to argue against any increased 
war effort and, as had been his wont, he based his argument on both 
pragmatic and moral grounds. It was an indication of how much he 
had changed, however, when the vast majority of his argument involved 
the "moral responsibility" of the American people. Gone were the 
carefully reasoned arguments maintaining that a guerrilla war demanded 
a political side. Instead, Kennedy simply pointed out that all pre-
vious policy had failed: "It seems to me if we have learned anything 
over the period of the last 7 years, it is the fact that just continuing 
to send more troops, or increasing the bombing, is not the answer in 
Vietnam. 89 This observation summed up the pragmatic arguments against 
the war by RFK. 
Even the brief statement of pragmatic problems with Johnson's policy 
became wrapped up with the moral argument when Kennedy connected him-
self to the failed predictions: 
The fact is that victory is not just ahead of us. It 
was not in 1961 or 1962, when I was one of those who 
predicted there was light at the end of the tunnel. There 
was not in 1963 or 1964 or 1965 or 1966 or 1967 and there 
is not now. 90 
The careful listing of each year of failure reinforced the impression 
of a long, hopeless effort. Kennedy's willing identification with 
that cause, a rhetorical strategy that dated back to his final break 
with the President on March 2, 1967, added a strong emotional appeal 
to a supposedly pragmatic argument. Again, Kennedy's admission of 
error made it easy for others to admit error and to accept the moral 
responsibility he demanded they bear. 
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Kennedy, after briefly indicating that some sort of new policy 
needed to be tried, resumed his attack on the old path. Specifically, 
he focused on the moral shortcomings of the current Administration stance, 
and he did so in the strongest language he had ever used. Kennedy 
created analogy after analogy that placed the United States in an 
indefensible moral position and certainly disturbed the audience. The 
brother of the martyred President, a man about to declare his candidacy 
for the Presidency of the United States, compared America to Hitler's 
Germany and Stalin's Russia: 
As to our own interests in Vietnam, could not the Germans 
or the Russians have argued the same thing before the 
beginning of World War II--that they had the right to 
go into Poland, into Estonia, into Latvia, into Lithuania, 
because they needed them for their own protection, that 
they needed them as a buffer? I question whether we 
have that right in this country.91 
These analogies speak powerfully to us today, but in 1968, with World 
War II still fresh in many minds, and memories of displaced and suffering 
Eastern European immigrants even fresher, they struck an even more 
sensitive nerve. Moreover, they spoke directly to the ethnic white vote 
Kennedy needed to break Johnson's base of support and win the nomination. 
If Kennedy could turn these people against the war, the people who 
then formed much of the base of the Democratic Party in the northern 
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industrial states, he could defeat Johnson. The analogies hit a 
tender nerve with all Americans who abhorred Hitler and Stalin, but 
they were particularly powerful with the,people Kennedy needed to reach. 
Using many of the same tactics he had developed as an opponent of 
the war, Kennedy now acted as a proponent for his own candidacy. 
The rest of the speech also revealed such a purpose. While 
Kennedy condemned the war, he condemned it as a failure in leadership 
on the part of the President, a failure all, including himself, had 
acquiesced to. Now all had a "moral responsibility ..•. to ask 
some very significant questions. 1192 Kennedy focused specifically on 
the American right to wage the war: 
Are we like the God of the Old Testament that we can 
decide, in Washington, D.C., what cities, what towns, 
what hamlets in Vietnam are going to be destroyed? • 
Or do we have the authority to kill tens and tens of 
thousands of people because we say we have a connnit-
ment to the South Vietnamese? But have they been 
consulted--in Hue, in Ben Tre, or in the other towns 
that have been destroyed?93 
Kennedy concluded by arguing that some sort of a change in policy 
was needed and affirmed his belief that "we can do something about 
it in the Senate. 1194 Kennedy's speech indicated that he planned to 
go beyond the Senate, and on March 16, 1968, he announced his candidacy 
for the Presidency, 
The speeches discussed in this chapter presaged such a move. The 
Robert Kennedy of late 1966 and even early 1967 did not necessarily 
have to run for the highest office in the land. He had been arguing 
that the tactics used in the war violated the conscience of the American 
people. Given such transgressions, everyone bore a moral responsi-
bility to do as much as possible to end the war. They needed to 
extend themselves, to risk their own "existential worlds" to realize 
they were committing murder and then do something about it. Yet, as 
Kennedy repeatedly argued, national interest sometimes required war. 
Kennedy adhered to the position that the Vietnam War might well be 
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such a case until August of 1967. Then, at first tentatively, then 
angrily, Kennedy denounced the justification for the war. The conflict 
itself was morally corrupt. The only way to purge the guilt caused 
by the "tens of thousands of deaths" was to end the war. Everyone bore 
a personal, moral responsibility to take such an action, for when a 
country acts, it acts in the name of each of its citizens. By 1968, 
it was clear that Lyndon Johnson would not end the war any time soon and 
that only Robert Kennedy stood a fighting chance to wrest the Presidency 
from the incumbent. Once Kennedy asked his audience "to show as much 
willingness to risk some of our prestige for peace as to risk the 
lives of our young men in war," he had to demonstrate his willingness 
to risk himself or lose all hope of policy discussion and change. He 
himself set the standard that demanded a race for the Presidency. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
A THEORY OF PERSUASION: A SUMMARY 
OF ROBERT F. KENNEDY'S ARGUMENT 
The opening chapter of this thesis concluded with a remembrance 
of RFK by the New Republic. Amid all of Kennedy's achievements, Richard 
Strout singled out as the most memorable RFK's unique ability to reach 
people and have them believe in him and what he stood for. Very few 
politicians earn such an encomium, and I have tried to discover the 
reasons for such praise by analyzing Kennedy's rhetoric on the Vietnam 
War. My analysis emphasized Kennedy's rhetorical skill in establishing 
a kind of dialogue with the audience. Robert Kennedy sought to induce 
in the audience the same kind of policy reappraisal that he had under-
gone. Several theoretical concepts have informed my thinking. I have 
argued that Kennedy used strategies of confrontation, identification, 
and audience creation as ways to achieve what Maurice Natanson called 
genuine argument, and I have asserted that Kennedy's argumentative 
choices forced him to run for the Presidency or risk losing his credi-
1 bility with the American people. 
As indicated earlier, Natanson uses the term "genuine argument" 
to designate those disputes that actually affect the combatants. Most 
arguments, Natanson contends, affect the participants very -little, if 
11 H h 1 f kb k d · . 1 . z Th at a • e uses t e examp e o a stoc ro er a vising a c ient. e 
broker argues for a change in the client's portfolio, and although the 
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two clash over the issue, they do not risk any of their beliefs or 
values: "The concrete existence of each member of this dyad is pre-
3 cisely excluded from the argument~ he writes. By contrast, genuine 
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argument requires that fundamental assumptions be at risk. The 
debaters agree to commit themselves to "the full implications of a 
philosophical dialectic, a saying, in effect, 'if you argue you choose 
to open yourself to the risk of discovering that argument has a funda-
mental structure that has, in turn, profound implications for your own 
being. "'4 Rather than deciding whether or not to buy more Xerox stock, 
the arguer must risk 
the immediacy of the self's world of feeling, attitude, 
and the total subtle range of his affective and conative 
sensibility. To be perfectly blunt: When I truly risk 
myself to the viable possibility that the consequence of 
an argument may be to make me see something of the struc-
ture of my immediate world.s 
To open oneself to such change on a consistent basis would make 
life impossible. Instead, one selects and chooses among arguments. 
Natanson notes that to engage in genuine argument is to "publicize 
.f..your/ privacy. 116 Metaphorically, it would be as if you invited somebody 
into your home, "home as it is meant by the one for whom it is home. 117 
That does not happen very often, nor are people willing to take the 
risks necessary to explore their own fundamental beliefs and values every 
time an important issue comes up for debate. For genuine argument to 
occur, the disputants must feel the tremendous urgency of the issue, and 
they must also have a strong sense of trust in each other. Without 
excellent reasons, people will not abandon comfortable, conventional 
argument for the uncertainties of genuine argument. As Natanson 
concludes: 
Risk is established when the affective world of the 
person is existentially disrupted, and this disrup-
tion means that his immediate life of feeling and 
sensibility is challenged and made open to challeng1e. 8 
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Robert Kennedy wanted to create genuine argument. His speeches 
reflect a search for the means to induce Americans to undergo the same 
agonizing process of reappraisal of the war he himself had undergone. 
Kennedy faced a daunting task because to argue about and to question 
the American effort in Vietnam meant a redefinition of self for most 
people. "Good" Americans did not question the President during wartime. 
They automatically rallied around country and flag and fought the enemy 
when the call came. Moreover, if people examined the war, they might 
find Americans committing actions that violated their concepts of their 
country and of how Americans were supposed to behave. Even to argue 
about the justice of an American war against communism meant risking 
values about what role citizens should play in political decision making. 
It meant risking fundamental assumptions about the definition of a "good" 
American and, ultimately, it meant assuming responsibility for American 
actions in Vietnam, rather than letting the amorphous entity of govern-
ment be responsible for the killing. If Kennedy were to change policy, 
however, he had to turn the country against the President's policy and 
assume this monumental rhetorical burden. 
Analysis of Kennedy's speeches reveals three rnaJor strategies 
designed to meet these problems. As in most good rhetoric, these 
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strategies came together to form a seamless whole. Kennedy began 
with the assumption that, if Americans accepted the same responsibility 
for military actions that he had, they would feel the same guilt and 
undergo the same change of heart about the war. Most people, however, 
did not feel directly accountable for the actions of government, and 
thus did not feel the same guilt as Kennedy. Americans avoided genuine 
argument by disclaiming responsibility for the actions involved in 
prosecuting the war. RFK needed to shake the audience out of this compla-
cency and acceptance to make them carry the burdens of policy makers. 
Kennedy used his three major strategies to achieve this goal. He employed 
confrontative rhetorical strategies to create an "existential disruption" 
of the world of his audience. He sought to confront them with their 
responsibility for the war. Since, as I will argue below, confrontation 
implies shared values, it was an excellent means to achieve genuine argu-
ment. Kennedy confronted his audience, while using shared values to 
create identification. Finally, the values they shared allowed Kennedy 
to present an alternative view of what it meant to be an American, a 
redefinition consistent with the basic American values used to confront, 
yet, unlike the older view, flexible enough to allow dissent, even 
demand dissent, during a crisis. Kennedy forced Americans to argue 
about Vietnam, while assuring them that such an act did not mean a 
desertion of their identity as citizens. People other than "long-haired, 
hippie, radical freaks" could question justifications for the war. 
As indicated in Chapter 1 and above, Kennedy began ~ith a complacent 
audience. He needed a strategy that would allow him to shock them while 
he retained his credibility as a mainstream politician and political 
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leader. He settled upon a course of "non-totalistic confrontation." 
In an article published in 1969, Robert L. Scott and Donald K. Smith 
maintained that "Confrontation crackles menacingly from every issue 
in our country • . . . lan9:...7 reflects a dramatic sense of division. ,.lO 
Because of domestic conflict at that time, most critics have used 
concepts developed there only when they saw two value systems in irre-
vocable conflict. 11 What has been obscured is their description of the 
non-totalistic use of confrontative strategies to pry apart and remodel 
"the machines of established power. 1112 Rhetors may use strategies 
that upset and anger people, that force them to face issues they do not 
want to face, with the ultimate goal of attracting attention to those 
policies and bringing about change within the same basic system, rather 
than seeking to destroy that system. Further, confrontation as a stra-
tegy assumes shared values between speaker and audience. Confrontation 
depends upon the presence of guilt to succeed, for, if the audience 
feels no guilt, they can ignore the rhetors and treat them as aliens 
not wo~thy of serious attention. Guilt presumes the violation of some 
value; people do not feel guilty unless they feel they have done something 
wrong. Confrontative rhetoric forces the audience to come to grips 
with the fact that they have violated shared values respected by the 
society. Scott and Smith note this assumption when they discuss the 
attitude of radicals toward their establishment opponents: "having 
degraded humanity, you are overwhelmed by guilt. The sense of guilt 
stops your hand, for what you kill is the world you have made. 1113 Guilt 
can occur only if audience members acknowledge as true the violations 
of conscience the speaker charges. Thus, confrontation depends upon 
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shared values and can mean "only division, not radical division. 1114 
In Kennedy's case, he confronted the audience with their respon-
sibility for the moral transgressions of the war. In the March 2, 1967, 
speech on the Senate floor, Kennedy argued that the death of children 
in Vietnam required a sense of responsibility on the part of each 
individual American: "It is our chemicals that scorch the children and 
our bombs that level the villages." This was "not just a nation's 
responsibility but yours and mine. 1116 As indicated in Chapter 4, Kennedy 
used blunt language that contrasted sharply with official explanations. 
He described in detail "the vacant moment of amazed fear as mother 
and child watch death fall from improbable machines sent by a country 
17 they barely comprehend." Robert Kennedy asked the audience to dwell 
"on the horror" of the war, and forced them to realize the human conse-
quences of American actions. 18 RFK also demanded that Americans invoke 
their own values to judge the fitness of the war and the nature of 
America's search for peace: 
Yet we must also look to ourselves. We must have no 
doubt that it is not our acts or failures which bar 
the way; that there is nothing we have left undone 
which we might have done. Our own course must be sub-
ject to a ceaseless and critical examination, not with 
the certainty that change will bring success, but in 
order that our own people can take comfort and strength 
from the knowledge that America has taken every step, 
done every action, and performed every deed within its 
power to put an end to this distant and ferocious war.19 
The echo of John Kennedy's inaugural address, the "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard of American justice, and the powerful religious require-
ment to avoid "sins of omission" all combine to demand that Americans 
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critically examine the war or be willing to accept the death it has 
caused. Such a critical examination of a policy that had caused 
tremendous suffering with no visible progress was likely to lead to 
the kind of change Kennedy wanted. As the previous chapters indicate, 
Robert Kennedy clearly and consistently invoked the conscience of 
each individual American to judge the horror of the war. Only if the 
individual audience member could accept all of the deaths could s/he 
reject genuine argument on the issue of Vietnam. Since Kennedy repeatedly 
demonstrated that the war violated anyone's sense of decency, RFK's chances 
of failure were slight. 
As shown, Kennedy's confrontative strategy presumed the use of 
traditional American values. Even as Kennedy confronted the audience, 
then, he created identification. An earlier discussion revealed the 
many doubts people possessed about Robert Kennedy, Nevertheless, he 
never alienated himself from "Middle America" and he always had the 
. 1 b d h d f A · ' ZO potentia to em o y t e reams o many mericans. He could create a 
bond of trust, a feeling of identification. The importance of this 
ability cannot be underestimated, As Burke says: "You persuade a man [sic] 
only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, 
d . . d . d . f . · h h · 1121 or ,er, imagery, i ea, i enti ymg your way wit is. If Kennedy 
had merely disrupted the world of the audience, he would never have 
achieved genuine argument. He would have been just another radical alien. 
Implicit in the concepts of genuine argument and confrontation is the 
necessity for identification. Without a sense that "he is one of us, 
I can trust him," one would always reject the kinds of charges Kennedy 
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leveled. RFK's use of American, patriotic symbols helped create identi-
f . . 22 1.cat1.on. Moreover, he began with the enormous advantage of his last 
name. Robert Kennedy was a living reminder, if not the incarnation, 
of the martyred President who, as critics admit, knew how to bring 
the country together in a vision of what it meant to be an American. 
Finally, and most important, RFK admitted his own mistakes in formulating 
the policy that led to Vietnam. 23 Kennedy was the only public official 
in this period to combine his attacks on the war with an admission that 
h f lt 11 "bl f h 1 f h · 1 · d · 24 e e persona y responsi e or t e resu ts o 1.s ear 1.er ec1s1ons. 
Kennedy enacted the kind of process he wanted all Americans to undergo. 
By doing so, he made it much easier for people to question the war. If 
Robert Kennedy could express doubts, admit guilt, and call for change, 
then that course was legitimate and possible for all Americans. Kennedy 
used his credibility as a politician and a Kennedy to create a strong 
sense of identification with the audience and to legitimate and encourage 
the questioning process they had begun to undergo. 
Kennedy's example constituted but one of several strategies he 
used to help the audience in its process of redefinition. To sunnnarize 
the argument to this point, Kennedy needed to find some way to open 
the debate on the war, since patriotic Americans simply did not question 
the justifications for a conflict while it raged. RFK needed to create 
the context for genuine argument, because to generate debate meant 
to redefine what Americans did or did not do. The act of argument 
would have strong implications for each American, whether or not an 
individual decided to oppose the war. Thus, Kennedy used confrontative 
strategies to "existentially disrupt" the world of the audience and 
force them to risk themselves. They would only do this, however, if 
Kennedy had established enough identification to allow the kind of 
trusting relationship that genuine argument demands. The shared 
values implicit in confrontation allowed him to achieve that goal, as 
did his explicit embrace of American symbols and patriotic values. 
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But, if Kennedy were to threaten the existing definition of what an 
American did during a war, he needed to provide an alternative. People 
will not venture into the unknown without some guidance. Kennedy 
redefined the nature of American patriotism through his own example 
and in several speeches, but never more clearly than in the concluding 
paragraph of his February 8, 1968, speech at the Book and Author 
L h ' Ch . Ill . . 25 unc eon in icago, 1no1s. 
Senator Kennedy began the conclusion with the normal assertion 
that "No war has ever demanded more bravery from our people and our 
26 government." Kennedy continued, however, by creating a hierarchy of 
courage. All wars demanded "bravery under fire," or the "bravery to 
make sacrifices. 1127 Those actions were to be expected. The Vietnam 
war required a new, and finer, quality: "the bravery to discard the 
28 comfort of illusion--to do away with false hopes and alluring promises." 
Only this kind of courage, the courage RFK exemplified, could cope 
with the new and deadly conflict and realize the promise of "a great 
29 nation and a strong people." Kennedy concluded that good Americans, 
brave Americans, did not shrink from the challenge, for the consequences 
of such cowardice were profound: 
Any who seek to comfort rather than speak plainly, reassure 
rather than instruct, promise satisfaction rather than 
reveal frustration--they deny that courage and drain 
that strength. For today, as it was in the beginning, 
it is the truth that makes us free. 
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Robert Kennedy not only legitimized dissent, he made it a sacred duty. 
Americans could engage in genuine argument over the war, they could 
accept the implications of the argumentation, for they would be 
fulfilling the most demanding requirements of what it meant to be an 
American. 
The three theoretical concepts depend on one another and form a 
coherent theory of persuasion that offers an option to speakers facing 
similar situations. RFK wanted to change a complacent audience's 
views of U.S. policy in Vietnam. Natanson's injunction to "existentially 
disrupt" the world of the complacent audience suggests that a confron-
tative rhetorical strategy would be a good choice in such circumstances. 
Confrontation also presumes that the speaker and the audience share 
certain values, which can be used to create guilt. A tactic based on 
shared values encourages identification and builds the kind of trust 
necessary for genuine argument. Finally, if the speaker can assist in 
the process of redefinition of self entailed by genuine argument, he or 
she can strongly reinforce the argument for change. The new "people" 
created by Robert Kennedy, for instance, would be willing to parti-
cipate in genuine argument and subJect the war to "ceaseless and critical 
examination." Such an examination will likely lead to strong demands 
for change. 
A rhetor must also realize the consequences of choosing to adopt 
these rhetorical strategies. Robert F. Kennedy demanded that every 
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American take up the sacred duty to do everything possible to end the 
war. After all, the guilt he created not only demanded argument, it 
demanded change. With Lyndon Johnson in office, change was unlikely. 
Opposing the war did not necessitate entry into the primaries against 
Johnson. Many Democrats sought to swallow the bitter with the sweet of 
incumbency and do the best they could with Johnson. Robert Kennedy, 
however, created a moral crusade. He chose to invoke deeply held 
values of compassion and decency and call them into service against 
the war. He also enshrined "sins of omission" as a criterion for 
judging national policy. If he refused to become personally engaged 
in this crusade, he would violate the sense of trust he had established 
with the audience. No one can make an issue into a moral crusade and 
make dissent a sacred duty, and then disappear when the time for action 
arrived, without losing a tremendous amount of credibility. If Robert 
Kennedy demanded that all people stand up and be counted, he needed to 
do the same. He could not define courage as he did and stay out of 
New Hampshire. 
As we all know, he stayed out of the race. How Kennedy translated 
what Newsweek called his "apocalyptic rhetoric" into that most pragmatic 
discourse, campaign oratory, becomes the next natural subject for study. 
Robert Kennedy acted as a moral critic of the war. As a presidential 
candidate, he had to try to make Mayor Richard Daley and Senator Eugene 
McCarthy see their common interest in defeating Richard Nixon. Kennedy 
found himself trying to make a case against a Democratic President and 
against his challengers in the primaries, while trying to down lay 
a unified foundation for the fall campaign, and while taking into 
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account his rhetorical past as a moralist. Robert Fo Kennedy faced a 
great challenge, a challenge defined in the past by his choice of rhetorical 
strategies as a Senate critic of the war from 1964 through 1968. 
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